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CONFIDENTIALITY AND JUVENILE MENTAL HEALTH
RECORDS IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
David R. Katner*
Providing children's disclosures to their mental health therapists greater
protection in juvenile dependency cases recognizes the importance of privacy in
therapeutic communications. Numerous children are required by juvenile courts
to divulge the most intimate details of their lives to mental health experts only to
have those disclosures revealed in court proceedings. Reversing the presumption
that children's mental health records may be discussed openly in dependency
litigation and requiring courts to perform in camera reviews affords children the
dignity and respect adults take for granted. Ensuring greater confidentiality for
children's mental health records is one step the legal system should take to protect
these fragile victims of abuse and neglect.
No one will deny that the law should in some way effectively use expert
knowledge wherever it will aid in settling disputes. The only question
is as to how it can do so best.
Learned Hand'
INTRODUCTION
Children rarely participate in deciding whether and how much of their mental
health records gets disclosed in dependency proceedings in juvenile courts.2 As
these children are often separated from their parents and families, they rarely have
concerned adults involved in their daily lives advocating their privacy interests
when they have been involved in mental health evaluations, assessments, treatment,
or therapy. Learning that the information supplied to a mental health professional
may find its way into a court record, or may become the subject of discussion in a
* Professor of Clinical Law & Director of the Juvenile Law Clinic, Tulane Law School,
New Orleans, LA.
1 Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L.
REv. 40,40 (1901).
2 For a discussion about increasing the participation and involvement ofchildren instate
care in the decisions which impact their lives, see Judy Cashmore, Promoting the
Participation of Children and Young People in Care, 26 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 838
(2002).
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court proceeding, is more than a little overwhelming. For a child in a dependency
case, such disclosures are not simply embarrassing Such disclosures may easily
cause the child to forego any further communications with an otherwise trusted
mental health professional. Thus, children at risk for mental, emotional, or
behavioral disorders may not receive necessary mental health services while in state
custody.4 Balancing the needs of dependency courts seeking to provide a safe haven
for children while protecting the confidentiality of children's mental health records
is a challenging but worthwhile objective. Rather than assuming that children's
mental health records should routinely be available and disclosed in dependency
proceedings, there are compelling reasons to create procedural safeguards to restrict
access to these records whenever possible. Preserving the confidentiality of
therapeutic interventions with children should be a fundamental objective of
dependency courts.
As a society, we continue to struggle with the ways in which we treat minors
differently from adults in the legal system. Much of the underlying tension in the
representation of child clients stems from the lack of certainty of the legal rights of
children.' This tension is epitomized by legislatures adopting paternalistic juvenile
' See Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?: The Critique of
Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 112 (1999) (noting that
federal child welfare policy in dependency cases has shifted emphasis from the reunification
of children in foster care with their biological families under the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,94 Stat. 500, to support for adoption of these
children to new families by adopting swifter timetables for terminating the rights of abusive
or neglectful biological parents under the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in sections of 42 U.S.C.)).
' The 2001 Report of the American Bar Association's Steering Committee on the Unmet
Legal Needs of Children indicated that:
An estimated one in five children in the United States has a mental, emotional
or behavioral disorder, and many suffer from disorders that substantially
diminish their ability to function. Four million children suffer from a "major
mental illness that results in significant impairments at home, at school, and with
peers...."
A substantial number of children at risk for mental illness and substance abuse
do not receive necessary mental health services.
ABA STEERING COMM. ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN, AMERICA'S CHILDREN
STILL AT RISK 75 (2001) (quoting U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvS., MENTAL
HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 124 (1999)) (citation omitted).
S For a general discussion of the inconsistencies of the court system's handling of the
rights of children in different contexts - within their families, in the social service system,
in health care, in education, in juvenile justice, and in employment- and a proposal for the
development of a national policy based upon the 1989 United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, see NANCY E. WALKER, CATHERINE M. BROOKS, & LAWRENCE S.
WRIGHTSMAN, CHILDREN's RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, IN SEARCH OF A NATIONAL
POLICY (1999). For a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in children's rights
cases over the past four decades, see generally Susan Gluck Mezey, Constitutional
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curfew laws6 while simultaneously lowering the age at which children may be tried
in adult criminal courts and exposed to the harshest of penal sanctions, the death
penalty.7 States restrict the ability of children to vote, operate motor vehicles8 or
purchase alcohol,9 but adopt judicial bypass provisions allowing minors to obtain
abortions without parental knowledge or consent.'0 The concept of confidentiality
of mental health records" - taken for granted by adult patients - is often ignored
or minimized when patients are minors. Given the inherent limitations the law
imposes on the rights of minors, 2 it is not difficult to understand why children's
Adjudication of Children's Rights Claims in the United States Supreme Court, 1953-92, 27
FAm. L.Q. 307 (1993).
6 See 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF CH.DREN, § 14.07, at 605 (Donald T. Kramer ed., 2d ed.
1994) (noting that while a state has more power to regulate and restrict the activity of minors
than adults, it is unclear whether curfew laws are constitutionally valid); Brian Privor, Dusk
Til Dawn: Children's Rights and the Effectiveness ofJuvenile Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U.
L. REV. 415 (1999); Tona Trollinger, The Juvenile Curfew: Unconstitutional Imprisonment,
4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 949 (1996); Patryk J. Chudy, Note, Doctrinal Reconstruction:
Reconciling Conflicting Standards in Adjudicating Juvenile Curfew Challenges, 85 CORNELL
L. REv. 518 (2000).
' See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (upholding death penalty
sentences for sixteen- and seventeen- year-olds); Thompsonv. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,838
(1988) (overturning adeathpenalty sentence of apersonunder sixteenyears ofage on Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment grounds).
8 See LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 6, at § 14.06.
9 See id. at § 14.09, at 621 (noting that the purpose of prohibiting the sale of alcohol to
minors is to "protect them").
Io See id. at § 14.16, at 653-54 (discussing the balancing to be done when evaluating
these systems); see also J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Minors as Medical Decision Makers: The
Pretextual Reasoning of the Court in the Abortion Cases, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 65, 69
(2000).
By examining the Court's failure to consider the allocation of authority between
parents and children in the critical realm of medical decision making, this article
exposes the irrationality of the Court's acceptance of limitations on the abortion
rights of minors and reveals the pronatalist thrust of the parental involvement
decisions.
Id.
' See Joel Glover & Erin Toll, The Right to Privacy of Medical Records, 79 DEN. U. L.
REV. 540, 549 (2002) (noting that the "right to privacy of medical records is seldom
contested").
2 The Supreme Court's refusal to recognize affirmative duties in the Constitution is often
traced to its narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases. See
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects ofSlaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights
View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409,410-12 (1990) (challenging the Supreme
Court's refusal to embrace the full meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and not imposing
affirmative rights). This restrictive rights approach is perhaps epitomized by the analysis of
the Due Process Clause and its application to children in the foster care system in DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193 (1989) (denying that the state
had a duty under the Due Process Clause to intervene and protect a child from abuse).
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right to confidentiality of mental health records has received relatively little
attention. 3 Nevertheless, the widespread reliance on mental health experts and
records in juvenile law 4 involving dependency cases suggests that fundamental
protections should be examined and provided to children whose lack of privacy
would simply not be tolerated by adult patients involved in litigation.
Along with the increased public awareness of child sexual and physical abuse
and neglect as a recurring social problem," juvenile courts have increased their
reliance on mental health experts, far beyond anything foreseen when the first
juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899.16 Historically, juvenile court
proceedings have been shrouded in secrecy in order to prevent children from
becoming stigmatized 7 and to allow for their treatment and possible rehabilitation,
'1 But see JoY PRnTrs ET AL., THE STATE OF HEALTH PRIVACY: AN UNEVEN TERRAIN (A
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF STATE HEALTH PRIVACY STATUTES) 607 (1999).
"4 In addition to social workers, psychiatric social workers, physicians, nurses, and
psychiatrists:
[W]ith increasing frequency, psychologists are being called on to provide expert
testimony in legal situations involving allegations of child sexual abuse. Some
of these experts are clinical psychologists, functioning as forensic evaluators,
treating clinicians, or researchers studying sexual abuse and related topics.
Others are developmental and cognitive psychologists who focus on relating
children's memory and suggestibility to their abilities to provide accurate
testimony. As is the case with other professionals who serve as expert witnesses,
the involvement of psychologists is based on the assumption that their expertise
can facilitate the interpretation of evidence that is presented to the court.
Peter A. Ornstein & Betty N. Gordon, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: A Comment, in
EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES: WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE SAID IN COURT 237
(Stephen J. Ceci & Helene Hembrooke eds., 1998).
"s Professor John E.B. Myers argues that the phenomenon and public recognition ofchild
sexual abuse as a widespread social problem emerged from secrecy at four times in recent
history. See 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 163-65
(3d ed. 1997). The earliest emergence dates back to French physician Ambrose Tardieu's
1857 book, A MedicoLegal Study ofAssaults on Decency, and the most recent emergence
is credited to the 1962 publication of C. Henry Kempe and colleagues' The Battered Child
Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17 (1962). Id.
"6 Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv.
1187, 1191 (1970). See generally Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court,
75 MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991) (noting that the juvenile court has changed from what the
Progressives imagined would be "an informal court whose dispositions reflected the 'best
interests of the child"').
"7 This was especially true withjuvenile delinquency cases. For a discussion ofthe policy
reasons supporting closure of delinquency courts, and an argument supporting the opening
of such hearings, see Stephan E. Oestreicher, Jr., Note, Toward Fundamental Fairness in the
Kangaroo Courtroom: The Due Process Case Against Statutes Presumptively Closing
Juvenile Proceedings, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1751 (2001).
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whenever appropriate. '8 The enactment of the 1974 Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act created congressionally-approved guidelines for the states to follow
in protecting the confidentiality of dependency proceedings. 9 Today, courts
depend upon mental health professionals to both evaluate and treat the children and
families who become parties in abuse and neglect cases, but the strict
confidentiality of these proceedings is being challenged as states revise their
policies of banning the public and the press from dependency cases."0
States approach the closing of dependency hearings in a number of different
ways. Many jurisdictions continue to exclude the general public from all juvenile
court proceedings.2' However, approximately sixteen states have a statute or
judicial rule that juvenile abuse and neglect proceedings must be open to the public,
barring exceptional circumstances.22 Some of these jurisdictions place no
restrictions on the opening of dependency hearings.2" Otherjurisdictions allow the
public and media access to juvenile proceedings based upon the nature of the
11 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,556 (1966) (stating that being "shielded from
publicity" is one of the distinct features of the juvenile court system).
"9 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974)
(codified and amended in 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (1966)).
20 See Susan S. Greenebaum, Note, Conditional Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings:
A Prior Restraint or a Viable Solution?, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135, 138-40
(1993); see also Emily Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should
the Courtroom Doors be Opened or Closed? 18 YALEL. & POL'YREV. 155, 156-59 (1999).
2" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-65(a) (1975) (stating that the "general public shall be
excluded from delinquency, in need of supervision, or dependency hearings"); HAw. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 571-41 (b) (Michie 2003) (stating that the "general public shall be excluded");
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 38 (West 2003) (stating that "all hearings ... shall be
closed to the general public"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C: 14 (Lexis Nexis 2001) (stating
that the "general public shall be excluded from any hearing under this chapter"); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-3-424(b) (Michie 2003) (stating that members of the "general public are excluded
from hearings under this act").
22 Margaret Graham Tebo, OpeningKid-A buse Hearings: Minnesota Joining States That
Allow Public Access to Juvenile Proceedings, 2 A.B.A. J. E-Report 6 (Jan. 18, 2002). See
generally Susan Harris, Open Hearings: A Questionable Solution, 26 WM. MrrCHiELLL. REv.
673 (2000) (providing background to the debate in Minnesota and arguing against opening
of hearings).
' The following jurisdictions follow a presumption that juvenile hearings are open to the
general public: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.507(2) (West 2002) (stating that "[a]l hearings...
shall be open to the public"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1502(7) (2003) (stating that the
"general public may not be excluded"); N.Y. CT. RULES § 205.4 (West 2000) (stating that
"[t]he Family Court is open to the public"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6336 (West 2003)
(stating that "general public shal not be excluded from any hearings"); TEX. FAMILY CODE
ANN. § 54.08 (Vernon 2002) (stating that "the court shall open hearings under the title to the
public").
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hearings.24 Finally, some jurisdictions grant the court much discretion2 5 to either
open or close proceedings based upon what appears to be in the child's best
interest.26 These variations in state policies have gradually shifted dependency
hearings away from the total exclusion of the public and press during the litigation
of abuse and neglect cases.27 As a result, when a mental health professional testifies
in a dependency proceeding, the testimony may be disclosed before people who are
not connected to the child's case in any way.
24 The following jurisdictions usually treat dependency and delinquency adjudications
differently. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.110(a) (Michie 2002) (stating that the "public
shall be excluded from the hearing"), with ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.110(d) (Michie 2002)
(stating that "a court hearing on a petition seeking the adjudication of a minor as delinquent
shall be open to the public if the alleged act is a felony or other crime or behavior defined by
this section"). Compare CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (West 1998) (stating that the
"public shall not be admitted to a juvenile court hearing"), with CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 676 (West 1998) (stating that "members of the public shall be admitted... to hearings
concerning petitions filed pursuant to Section 602" which contains a list of felony offenses).
Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.163(l)(c) (West 2003) (stating that "the court shall
exclude the general public from hearings under this chapter") with MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260B. 163(1)(c) (West 2003) (stating that "[t]he court shall open the hearings to the public
in delinquency... proceedings" where the offense would be a felony and the accused is at
least 16 years of age). Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-20(B) (Michie 1978) (stating that
"[a]ll abuse and neglect hearings shall be closed to the general public"), with N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32A-2-16(B) (Michie 1978) (stating that "all hearings on petitions pursuant to the
provisions of the Delinquency Act [this article] shall be open to the general public").
2 For a briefdiscussion of the constitutionality ofthe Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act,
18 U.S.C. § 5031-5042 (2000), which authorizes closure ofhearings at the discretion of the
judge, see Cheri Panzer, Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings, 18 J. Juv. L. 209,214(1997)
(arguing that "the Act does not violate First Amendment nor common law rights of public
access to juvenile court proceedings because it does not mandate the closure ofjuvenile court
proceedings"); Lauren A. Stagnone, Allowing Judicial Discretion in Determining Closure
of Juvenile Proceedings - United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1995), 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 999,999 (1997) (discussing the constitutional issues raised by the First
Circuit's holding that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act gave judges discretion to decide
whether or not to close juvenile court proceedings to the public).
' See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-60(g) (West 1987) (stating that "the court may...
permit public attendance during any court proceeding at a delinquency case, where it
determines that a substantial likelihood that specific harm to the juvenile would not result");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-801(a) (2001) (stating that "the court inits discretion shall determine
whether the hearing or any part of the hearing shall be closed to the public"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (West Supp. 2003) (stating that "the court still may admit to a
particular hearing... those persons who have a direct interest in the case and those who
demonstrate that their need for access outweighs the interest in keeping the hearing closed").
27 See William Wesley Patton, Pandora's Box: Opening Child Protection Cases to the
Press and Public, 27 W. ST. U. L. REv. 181, 182 (2000) (noting that "[e]ven though the press
and public do not possess a constitutional right of access to child protection proceedings and
records, several legislatures and members of the public have recently begun to move toward
opening those hearings and records").
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Even when states bar the public and press from dependency hearings, mental
health professionals are called upon to divulge children's disclosures frequently
made under the assumption that the statements would be held in confidence. In
many cases, mental health professionals play a pivotal role in litigation, and their
professional opinions2" are often the persuasive testimony that allows a court to
adjudicate children dependent in child abuse and neglect cases.2 9 In many cases
involving sexual misconduct, the testimony of mental health experts may be most
compelling where no physical or medical evidence corroborates the dependency
allegations.30 The American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Child Abuse and
28 It is important to recognize that the professional opinions ofthese mental health experts
are just that, opinions. Although the juvenile dependency system is very dependent upon the
diagnoses and treatment regimens offered by mental health professionals, these
determinations and recommendations are subject to error - perhaps yet another reason to
maintain the confidentiality of the mental health reports and evaluations. Some researchers
have acknowledged that:
Unfortunately, clinical judgments can be surprisingly inaccurate. Studies have
shown that mental health professionals often assign diagnoses when behavior
does not meet published criteria (Morey & Ochoa, 1989); fail to discriminate the
test results of actual clients from subjects who are asked to fake disability (Faust,
Hart, &Guilmette, 1988; Faust, Hart, Guilmette, and Arkes, 1988); and overlook
pathology in clients who are not typical examples, or good "prototypes," of a
disorder (Garb, 1996). In fact, some researchers have shown that trained
professionals often do no better than simple formulas at diagnosing or predicting
clients' behavior, and no better than lay persons in treating behavior disorders
(see Dawes, 1994b, and Grove and Meehl, 1996, for reviews, and Garb, 1989,
1992, for exceptions).
There is no reason to believe that the judgments made in child abuse
evaluations deviate from these general trends.
DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CHILDREN: A GUIDE
FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALs 212 (1998) (emphasis added).
29 Ceci and Bruck suggest that:
When a child comes to court to testify, it is often because she is the sole witness
to a crime. This is particularly likely to be the situation in sexual abuse cases,
where not only is the child the sole witness, but there may be no medical signs
of abuse, or circumstantial physical evidence. The difficulty posed by
uncorroborated reports of sexual abuse is compounded by the fact that the
testimony of young children may at times seem to lack credibility.
STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROoM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS
OF CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 269 (1995).
30 Myers counsels that:
Child sexual abuse is often difficult to prove. The child is usually the only
eyewitness. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Supreme Court noted that "[c]hild
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part
because there often are no witnesses except the victim." [480 U.S. 39,60 (1987)]
[A]Ithough most children are competent witnesses, some cannot take the stand.
Many children find the courtroom a forbidding place, and, when a child is asked
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Neglect has recognized that properly diagnosing child sexual abuse can often occur
based on the child's history alone, that physical findings are often absent, and that
many types of abuse leave no physical evidence.3 Because of the lack of physical
evidence in many of these cases, the opinions and findings of mental health
professionals often serve as the foundation for a court's decision to adjudicate a
child in need of care or dependent. Following mental health professionals' crucial
involvement in the adjudication stage of dependency cases,32 these professionals
often continue their involvement by providing additional evaluations and treatment
or therapy for children and their families throughout the disposition and sometimes
post-disposition phases of dependency cases.33
Some of the children involved in abuse and neglect cases are fortunate enough
to find placements in safe and secure environments - including being returned to
their own families34 - in a relatively short period of time,35 or they may spend
months, or sometimes even years,36 of their childhood in group placements or foster
to testify against a familiar person, especially a loved one, the experience can be
overwhelming. Consequently, children's testimony is sometimes ineffective. The
problems of ineffective testimony and lack of eyewitnesses are compounded by
the paucity of physical evidence in many child sexual abuse cases. (Citing Mark
D. Everson & Barbara W. Boat, False Allegations of Sexual Abuse by Children
and Adolescents, 28 J. AM. ACADEMY OF CHILD & ADOL. PSHY. 230-35, at 230
(1989) ("physical evidence is found in only 15% of confirmed cases")).
I JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 411-12 (3d ed. 1997).
3' See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect,
Guidelines for the Evaluation ofSexualAbuse of Children: Subject Review, 103 PEDIATRICS
186, 188 (1999).
32 The adjudication is crucial because unless the state (or the petitioning party) is able to
sufficiently prove allegations of abuse or neglect, the child may be returned to a harmful -
in some cases, life threatening - environment. Mental health professionals, however, often
are involved in providing services to families prior to the filing of legal petitions. They may
provide therapy or treatment through community mental health clinics or hospitals; however,
the focus of this Article is on the testimony and record keeping of mental health professionals
in the context of the litigation process.
" See George J. Alexander, Big Mother: The State's Use of Mental Health Experts in
Dependency Cases, 24 PAC. L.J. 1465 (1993).
1 For a critique of the ASFA's failure to adequately promote more adoptions of children
in state foster care systems, see Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The
Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REv. 637
(1999).
31 Note, however, that the amount of time from validation of abuse or neglect allegations
until the child is returned home, placed in foster care, or adopted continues to be longer for
African American children. See Stephen A. Kapp et al., The Path to Adoption for Children
of Color, 25 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 216 (2001).
36 Dyer reports that:
According to the CWLA [Child Welfare League of America], there was a 21%
increase in children in out-of-home care from 1990 to 1995, with a total of
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homes." Some estimate a 60% increase in the number of children in the United
States foster care system from 1982 to 1995, when the number climbed to nearly
480,000.38 Current estimates place more than 500,000 children in foster care
systems throughout the nation.39 In addition to having been abused or neglected'
by their families, many of the children with cases in the juvenile court system suffer
from prenatal exposure to drugs4 ' or alcohol,42 - with estimates of well over one
483,629 children in such placements in 1995. Of the children who left care in
1995, the median number of months spent in foster care was 11. Of the children
who remained in care in 1995, the median number of months spent in foster care
was 22.1.
FRANK J. DYER, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULTATION IN PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES 17 (1999).
3 According to Goldstein:
Following the permanency planning reforms of the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, it appears that the average length of stay in out-of-
home placements dropped - an apparent success. But it appears that some
children (15% in one study) who were returned home after briefer foster care
placements soon reentered foster care because of reabuse.
ROBERT D. GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 765 (1999).
" Laurel K. Leslie et a]., Children in Foster Care: Factors Influencing Outpatient
Mental Health Service Use, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 465,466 (2000).
39 Id.
o Despite the large numbers of children in foster care, the numbers of children who are
reported to child protection services are even more staggering. Legal definitions of abuse and
neglect differ from state to state, court required proof that children have been harmed, as
opposed to simply a showing of potential future harm, and evidentiary problems in proving
neglect or abuse contribute to the numbers of cases which are closed and never result in
litigation:
In 1984, 1,727,000 [children] were reported to CPS [child protective service
agencies] (American Association for the Protection of Children, 1986); by 1994,
2.9 million children were reported to CPS nationwide, and 1 million of these
cases were substantiated. Data from the 1994 National Child Abuse and Neglect
Data System indicate that child neglect is reported at twice the rate of physical
abuse and nearly four times the rate of sexual abuse .... Official estimates based
on reported cases are clearly low; the Third National Incidence Study indicates
that professionals do not report as much as 40% of the maltreatment that they
identify (Sedlak & Broadhurst, 1996).
Diana J. English, Evaluation and Risk Assessment of Child Neglect in Public Child
Protection Services, in NEGLECTED CHILDREN, RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 195-96
(Howard Dubowitz ed., 1999).
41 See COCAINE, EFFECTS ON THE DEVELOPING BRAIN 846 (John A. Harvey & Barry E.
Kosofsky eds., 1998); JAMES A. INCLARDI Er AL., COCAINE-EXPOSED INFANTS: SOCIAL,
LEGAL, AND PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES 5 (1997).
42 See Sonja C. Davig, Crack-Cocaine Babies: Protecting Society's Innocent Victims, 15
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 281, 281 (1994). Davig points out that:
As many as 11% of pregnant women are using illegal drugs during pregnancy.
The choice of drug for two-thirds of these mothers is crack cocaine. The cost to
the state for these babies exposed to drugs throughout their mother's pregnancy
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million "infants born each year prenatally exposed to alcohol and illicit drugs"'4 3 -
mental retardation, attention-deficit or attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder,"
post-traumatic stress disorder,45 nonorganic failure to thrive,' developmental
delays,47 and a number of other infirmities,48 sometimes manifesting in different
ranges from $6,000 to $250,000 per infant, varying on the severity of the drug-
related problems.
Id. Judith Larsen et al., Medical Evidence in Cases of Intrauterine Drug and Alcohol
Exposure, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 279 (1991) (discussing the kinds of evidence in hospitals and
clinics which reveal, or disprove, infant drug and alcohol exposure); LaShanda D. Taylor,
Creating a Causal Connection from Prenatal Drug Use to Imminent Harm, 25 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 383 (1999). "Studies indicate that three-fourths of child neglect cases
involve parental problems with drugs or alcohol." Id. at 384; see also Kenneth A. DeVille
& Loretta M. Kopelman, Fetal Protection in Wisconsin's Revised Child Abuse Law: Right
Goal Wrong Remedy, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 332 (1999).
41 IraJ. Chasnoff& Lee Ann Lowder, PrenatalAlcohol and Drug Use andRiskfor Child
Maltreatment, A Timely Approach to Intervention, in NEGLECTED CHILDREN, RESEARCH,
PRACTICE, AND POICY 132, 133 (Howard Dubowitz ed., 1999).
44 See STEVEN R. PuSZKA ET AL, ADHD wrrH COMORBID DISORDERS, CLINICAL
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (1999).
41 See Peggy T. Ackerman et al., Prevalence of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and
Other Psychiatric Diagnoses in Three Groups ofAbused Children (Sexual, Physical, and
Both), 22 Child Abuse & Neglect 759 (1998); Kristin K. Schaaf & Thomas R. McCanne,
Relationship of Childhood Sexual, Physical, and Combined Sexual and Physical Abuse to
Adult Victimization and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1119
(1998).
46 Nonorganic failure to thrive is the result of the failure of parents to provide basic
nutritional and psychological nurturing needs ofchildrenwhich may impede physical growth.
James M. Gaudin, Jr., Child Neglect, Short Term and Long Term Outcomes, in NEGLECTED
CHILDREN, RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND PoLICY 89, 98 (Howard Dubowitz ed., 1999). In
comparison, Gaudin notes that "organic failure to thrive results from a medical problem that
impairs growth. The usual criteria are weight or height (or both) below the fifth percentile
and weight or height below the 10th percentile for children of the same age." Id.
41 Id. at 92.
4' According to Patricia Sullivan, children with disabilities are at increased risk to be
victims of child maltreatment:
A comprehensive study of children taken into foster care completed by the
University of Chicago School of Medicine found an overwhelming majority in
need of medical and psychological intervention (Hochstadt et al., 1987).
Physical evaluations found only 13% (out of 200) of the children to be normal.
Physical problems included growth problems (height, weight, and head
circumference); dermatologic, opthalmologic, neuromuscular, cardiovascular,
dental, and pulmonary abnormalities; fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS); congenital
anomalies; ear infections; and pregnancy. Psychological evaluations found 56%
of the children over 3 years of age in need of psychological treatment, 52% of
the children under 3 years of age in need of infant stimulation due to
developmental delays, and 2% in need ofpsychiatric residential treatment. These
findings are consistent with previous research indicating that abused and
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degrees of comorbidity,49 which require special attention while the cases are
litigated or mediated."0 Comorbidity appears to be relatively common in young
people with mental retardation, anxiety disorders, learning disorders, and disorders
of conduct and attentiveness. 5'
Other children are at risk for maltreatment or further abuse while they reside in
foster care facilities,52 for which the state may be legally liable.53 Many of the
children placed in out-of-home foster care facilities also suffer from isolation from
friends, families, and schools, and the trauma of frequent changes in foster care
placements, especially common among older foster children. 4 All of these children
and their families frequently require mental health evaluations, and in many
neglected children have significant cognitive, developmental, and emotional
deficits. (Elmer & Gregg, 1967; Fitch et al., 1976; Appelbaum, 1977; Kline,
1977; Koski & Ingram, 1977).
Patricia M. Sullivan, Developmental Aspects of the Young Child in Maltreatment Cases, in
CHILD MALTREATMENT, A CLINIcAL GUIDE AND REFERENCE 213,236 (J.A. Monteleone &
A.E. Brodeur eds., 2d ed. 1998).
'4 "Comorbidity" is the condition whenever two different disease processes are present
in an individual patient. PLISZKA Er AL, supra note 44, at 4. See also Richard Famularo et
al., Psychiatric Comorbidity in Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 20 CH1lD ABUSE&NEGLECT
953 (1996).
50 See Inger Sagatun-Edwards & Coleen Saylor, Drug-Exposed Infant Cases in Juvenile
Court: Risk Factors and Court Outcomes, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 925 (2000) (stating
that the mother's behavior appears to be more important to outcomes of cases in juvenile
court than ethmicity, past referrals, and criminal records).
5' JAMES MORRISON & THOMAS F. ANDERS, INTERVIEWING CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS: SKILS AND STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE DSM-IV DIAGNOSIS 11 (2001).
52 See Georgina F. Hobbs et al., Abuse of Children in Foster and Residential Care, 23
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1239 (1999).
" See Christina Chi-Young Chou, Renewing the Good Intention of Foster Care:
Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the Substantive
Due Process Right to Safety, 46 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1993); Christine M. Dine, Comment,
Protecting Those Who Cannot Protect Themselves: State Liability for Violation of Foster
Children's Right to Safety, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 507 (2002); Brendan P. Kearse, Abused
Again: Competing Constitutional Standardsfor the State's Duty to Protect Foster Children,
29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 385 (1996).
4 Heather N. Taussig, Risk Behaviors in Maltreated Youth Placed in Foster Care: A
Longitudinal Study of Protective and Vulnerability Factors, 26 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
1179 (2002).
The long-term research on foster children grown up suggests that they are at risk
of experiencing continued difficulties in adulthood. A recent study found that
12-18 months after leaving foster care (due to emancipation), 27% of the males
and 10% of the females had been incarcerated, 37% had not finished high
school, and 50% were unemployed. (Courtney & Piliavin, 1998).
Id. at 1180 (citations omitted).
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instances mental health treatment or psychotherapy." One group of researchers
asserts that thirty-five percent to eighty-five percent of children entering foster care
have significant mental health problems ranging from relational and coping
difficulties and school failure, to emotional and behavioral disturbances causing
moderate to severe impairment, with conduct disorder, attention disorders,
aggressive behavior, and depression being the most common disorders.56 The
impact of abuse or neglect is not limited to the victim's childhood years. One
scholar has noted that:
Studies of adults with a known history of child maltreatment document
that the adult years may exhibit a range of negative outcomes, including
personality and mood disorders, substance abuse disorders, poor social
adjustment, vulnerability to further victimization, and chronic physical
health problems. While such disorders are not the inevitable outcome
of early abuse or neglect, research documents that these outcomes occur
significantly more often in adults who were abused as children than in
adults with no history of abuse .... While many may appear to function
adequately as adults, many of these adults pay a significant
psychological cost that is reflected in chronic medical, mental health,
and relationship difficulties, as well as occupational underachievement. 7
Juvenile courts rely upon three groups of mental health professionals to
evaluate and treat children and their families: psychiatrists (including
psychoanalysts), psychologists, and social workers. The recent shift in the role of
these three groups combined with the impact of managed health care systems"8 has
resulted in non-medically trained professionals (psychologists and social workers)
providing most psychotherapy ordered by courts or provided by state child
protection agencies. 9 The difference in the fees charged by these mental health
" See Candace A. Gross et al., Extrafamilial Serual Abuse: Treatmentfor Child Victims
and Their Families, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 9 (2000).
56 Leslie et al., supra note 38, at 466-67.
5' Barbara Whitman, Psychological and Psychiatric Issues, in ANGELO P. GIARDINO &
EILEEN R. GIARDINO, RECOGNITION OF CHILD ABUSE FOR THE MANDATED REPORTER 137,
138 (3d ed. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
s See John Petrila, Ethics, Money, and the Problem of Coercion in ManagedBehavioral
Health Care, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 359 (1996).
9 See MENTALHEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1996 (Ronald W. Manderscheid & Mary Anne
Sonnerschein eds., Center for Mental Health Services, 1996) (According to the American
Psychological Association, practicing psychiatrists (with medical degrees) "numbered 34,500
in comparison to more than 70,000 clinical psychologists with a Ph.D. or Psy.D."); see also
RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CivIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS 58-59 (3ded. 1999) (noting the numerical balance in favor ofclinical psychologists
is even greater if clinical psychologists who hold only a Master's degree are included).
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professionals has contributed to the juvenile court system's increased reliance on
the least expensive of the three groups of professionals" - usually social workers
- as mental health evaluators and therapists for children and their families. 61
Nevertheless, psychiatrists and psychologists continue to play major roles as
providers of mental health evaluations and treatment for children in the system.
62
Startling numbers of children are either evaluate' 63 or treated each year, with
the Surgeon General estimating that 21% of children age nine and up have mental
disorders, including depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and bipolar
disorder.' Additionally, children with organic problems, ranging from mental
retardation6" to fetal alcohol syndrome,6 must be evaluated and often require
Additionally, the National Association of Social Workers reported 25,000 offering
psychotherapy in the mid-1970's, while there were 60,000 by 1985. See id. at 54 (citing D.
Gorman, Social Workers Vault Into a Leading Role in Psychotherapy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1985, at C1).
'o For a discussion ofthe successful and unsuccessful legal attacks upon cost containment
mechanisms used by managed health care organizations, see Allison Faber Walsh, Comment,
The Legal Attack on Cost Containment Mechanisms: The Expansion of Liability for
Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207 (1997).
"l Jean Koh Peters has warned that court-appointed experts tend to have ongoing
relationships with the court, rather than with the child, the child's family, or the child's
attorney, and that:
Unfortunately, rates of payment for these court-appointed experts remain
relatively low. Until the rate of payment is raised to compensate fully the amount
of time a complete evaluation should take, many court-appointed experts will be
forced to seek a high volume of evaluations in order to be able to devote a
substantial amount of their practice to (and to be able to make a living by) doing
this difficult work.
JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL
AND PRACTICAL DIMENsIONS 139 (1997).
12 Id. at 138.
63 One psychologist/attorney author has noted that:
There is no paucity of tests available to assess, measure, and evaluate all sorts
of human attributes. The most definitive source, Tests in Print, lists more than
3000 entries that cover, inter alia, achievement tests (91 tests), educational tests
(128), intelligence tests/scholastic aptitude measures (233), personality tests
(669), and assessments of vocational interests and skills (568).... Lawyers are
most likely to see reports written on child and adolescent functioning that assess
intelligence, infant development, academic achievement, visual-motor
perception, auditory skills, motor proficiency, and personality.
Michael L. Lindsey, Ethical Issues in Interviewing, Counseling, and the Use of
Psychological Data with Child and Adolescent Clients, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2042
(1996) (footnotes omitted).
64 See Nancy Shute et al., The Perils of Pills: The Psychiatric Medication of Children is
Dangerously Haphazard, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 6, 2000, at 44.
65 The use of the term "mentally retarded" can be especially problematic for a child:
Labeling people as mentally retarded imposes a "shattering stigma," impairing
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treatment. Even children with no diagnosable problems may be evaluated and
exposed to mental health professionals in order to assist the children in coping with
the separation from their families, or to aid them in the process of reuniting with
often dysfunctional67 families."'
Before identifying ways of protecting children's confidential communications
with their mental health therapists, several observations are in order. First, a
distinction should be made between ordinary medical records and mental health
records. Second, a distinction may be made between confidentiality, privilege, and
the privacy rights of children who disclose information to professionals. Third, it
is important to recognize that the indiscriminate disclosure of children's mental
health records may have harmful - at times, even catastrophic - effects on the
lives of minor patients involved in juvenile proceedings. Fourth, mental health
professionals who treat and attorneys who represent children are urged to take
reasonable precautions to ensure the confidentiality of these mental health records.
At the very least, professionals who work with children should attempt to limit the
extent to which children's mental health issues and records are disclosed in court,
absent some compelling reason for the disclosure.
1. MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS VERSUS OTHER MEDICAL RECORDS
A strong argument may be made that mental health records are uniquely
different from ordinary medical records. Although many medical procedures give
their educational and occupational opportunities and dominating every aspect of
their lives. The severe social disadvantages of labeling people as mentally ill or
mentally retarded are augmented when the individual also is labeled
incompetent, thereby confirming general stereotypes about mental disability and
providing a further rationalization for the deprivation of social, occupational,
and educational opportunities.
Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects ofIncompetency Labeling and the Implicationsfor Mental
Health Law, I PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L. 6, 12 (1995) (footnote omitted).
66 See Larsen, Horowitz, & Chasnoff, supra note 42.
67 See Maxia Dong et al., The Relationship of Exposure to Childhood Sexual Abuse to
Other Forms ofAbuse, Neglect, and Household Dysfunction During Childhood, 27 CHILD
ABUSE&NEGLEcT 625 (2003) (noting that childhood sexual abuse is frequently accompanied
or strongly associated with multiple other forms of adverse childhood experiences and
household dysfunction).
68 Of course, not all families are good candidates for reunification:
Not all parents involved in abusive behavior toward their children can be
successfully treated. A few parents are too emotionally disturbed, either
psychotic, mentally retarded or severely sociopathic, to be able to resume the
tasks of caring for their children within a reasonable length of time before the
children are grown.
HELPING THE BATrFRED CHILD AND HIS FAMLY 14-18 (C. Henry Kempe & Ray E. Helfer
eds., 1972).
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rise to privacy concerns,69 the simple act of consulting a mental health specialist, in
itself, often creates such a stigma either in the minds of the public,7" or from the
perspective of the patient, that special treatment of mental health records should be
considered.7 Unlike most medical problems, the social stigma of mental health
problems creates a barrier against patients seeking out treatment. Perhaps as
developments in neurology and pharmacology become more widespread and
accepted,72 this social stigma will lessen or disappear, but at present it creates
compelling problems for those who need mental health treatment and sometimes for
those who provide the treatment. Perlin asserts that the discrimination against
persons with mental disabilities has continued for years:
Surveys show that mental disabilities are the most negatively perceived
of all disabilities. Individuals with mental disabilities have been denied
jobs, refused access to apartments in public housing or entry to places
in public accommodation, and turned down for participation in publicly
funded programs because they appear "strange" or "different." A series
of behavioral myths has emerged suggesting that persons with mental
disabilities are deviant, worth less than "normal" individuals,
disproportionately dangerous, and presumptively incompetent.73
69 See generally JONATHAN P. TOMES, HEALTHCAREPRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALIY: THE
COMPLETE LEGAL GUIDE (1994).
70 A recent survey found that seventy-one percent ofthe general population thought
that mental illness resulted from an emotional weakness; sixty-five percent
thought bad parenting caused mental illness; and forty-five percent thought
victims of mental illness could will it away. Only ten percent of the general
public thought that mental illness "had a biological basis or involved the brain."
Maria A. Morrison, Changing Perceptions of Mental Illness and the Emergence of
Expansive Mental Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REv. 8,9 (2000) (citing STEPHEN M.
STAHL, ESSENTIAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: NEUROSCIENTIFIC BASIS AND CLINICAL
APPLICATIONS 100 (1996)); see also Alison Bass, Stigma Against Mental Illness Persists
Despite New Research, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 16, 1992, at 3.
"' See generally Wayne Edward Ramage, The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for
Mental Health Care, 45 VAND. L. REV. 951,973 (1992).
7 Medications are increasingly used in the treatment of emotional and behavioral
disorders among adolescents (Greenhill and Setterberg, 1993; Simeon et al.,
1995). The demonstrated efficacy and economy of pharmacotherapy suggests
that medicine should and will be a vital element of a comprehensive treatment
plan for many adolescents with psychiatric diagnoses.
R. Alan Williams et al., Attitudes Toward Psychiatric Medications Among Incarcerated
FemaleAdolescents, 37 J.AM. ACAD. CHILD &ADOLESCENTPSYCHATRY 1301, 1302 (1998)
(footnotes omitted).
7 Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist
Attitudes be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 26-27 (1993-94).
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Even health care professionals fail to seek out mental health care because of
their fears of stigmatization and the potential consequences for their medical
licensure.7" Whether or not these fears are reasonable, they certainly exist and they
have tremendous consequences."
The impact of this stigmatization associated with mental health problems may
be even greater on children: "'Twenty percent or less of kids with major depression
get treatment,' says Neal Ryan, a professor of child psychiatry at the University of
Pittsburgh. Many of the children who are diagnosed are massively undertreated,
Ryan says, in part because of parents' fears of stigmatizing their children."7 6
Parental concerns about the stigma of a child's mental problems and the impact
on either the child or the child's family members creates a compelling reason to
safeguard this issue from public disclosure. While a parent might not hesitate to
take a child with a broken arm to the hospital for treatment, the same parent might
be reluctant to take the child to a mental health professional for treatment of
depression. Although older adolescents might be able to seek out professional help
on their own, perhaps from school counselors or publicly-funded mental health
clinics, younger children are completely dependent upon their parents or guardians
for such care. Thus, a parent's perception or fear might limit a child's access to
mental health treatment.77
Because such a large segment of the population involved in juvenile court
proceedings78 are indigent, 9 their family mobility is limited in comparison to
"4 See Steven H. Miles, A Challenge to Licensing Boards: The Stigma ofMental Illness,
280 JAMA 865 (1998).
71 See generally Winick, supra note 65 (discussing the impact of labeling of mentally ill
individuals as "incompetent" in the application of the law).
76 Shute et al., supra note 64, at 44.
7 Parental fears of stigmatization are not limited, of course, to exposing themselves to
the possible label of mental illness. Parental fears may also dictate whether or not physically-
injured children are brought to a hospital, or a health clinic. Parental fears over public
disclosure that a family member suffers from an addiction might also preclude a child from
receiving assistance. The potential stigmatization impact is not limited to issues of mental
health, but it certainly is a major issue in many instances where mental health problems exist.
Federle argues that:
In many ways, the modern juvenile court continues to be an institutional
response to the problems created by poverty. The dependency and foster care
systems have retained certain practices that make poor children more likely to
be the subject of a petition and less likely to escape foster care. For example,
some critics argue that removals are attributable to a general disdain for the
rights of poor parents; this may explain, in part, why poor parents are far more
likely to be charged with child abuse or neglect. Moreover, the need to rescue
children may signal a reluctance to return poor children to their parents;
consequently, poor children comprise a disproportionate number of all children
in the dependency and foster care systems. The Adoption and Safe Families Act
of 1997, with its renewed emphasis on permanency planning leading to adoption
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middle class and upper middle income families." Disclosing compromising
information about a family member in the community where a family lacks the
resources to move makes it very difficult for the child - or the child's family -
to avoid the consequences of the disclosure. Whereas people of means might
consider moving to a community where they are not known, such an option may not
be readily available to indigent families."' Additionally, even if a child's family
were in a position to consider such a course of action, the child herself is essentially
powerless in this situation,82 that is, she cannot elect to move on her own in order
rather than reunification, signifies a return to child-rescue practices that
disregard the rights of poor parents.
Katherine Hunt Federle, Child Welfare and the Juvenile Court, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225, 1235
(1999) (footnotes omitted).
9 The indigency of children involved in juvenile dependency proceedings makes them
especially vulnerable. One observer has noted that "[a] critical challenge facing managed
health care programs today is the creation of subsidized, workable health delivery programs
for disenfranchised and medically fragile groups, especially poor, developmentally disabled
children." Stephanie Rifldnson-Mann, M.D., Note, The Impact of Managed Care Payer
Contracts on the Subspecialty Medical Provider: Policy Implications That Impact on the
Care of Disabled Children, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1943, 1945 (2000) (footnote omitted).
SO See generally WmILLAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, THE INNER
CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POuCY (1987).
SI Defining poverty in the U.S. has become somewhat complicated:
The federal Office of Management and Budget defines poverty by setting money
income thresholds for various family sizes. The federal Census Bureau in turn
surveys the population to estimate the number of families who live below these
threshold income levels. It counts the family's pre-tax money income, including
wages, salaries, and Social Security and cash welfare benefits. It does not
include capital gains or noncash benefits such as food stamps, health insurance
payments, or medical benefits. The poverty line is adjusted annually to account
for changes in the Consumer Price Index .... For example, a family of two
lived below the official poverty threshold in 1995 if it had an annual income less
than $9,933. The figure for a family of four was $12,158.
JULIE A. NICE& LOUISEG. TRUBEK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 6 (1997).
8 According to Nice and Tmbek:
Children constitute only 26% of the general population, but 40% of all poor
people. The Census Bureau reported that the poverty rate for children has been
at or above 20% since the early 1980s.
According to a summary by the American Sociological Association, one-third
of all children in the United States experience at least a year of poverty during
their childhood. A 1998 report by the Children's Defense Fund and the National
Coalition for the Homeless found that the number of children in extreme poverty
(below half of the poverty line) increased by 400,000 between 1995 and 1997,
coincidentally a period of economic growth.
In its in-depth study, Dynamics of Economic Well-Being: Poverty 1993-1994,
the Census Bureau reported that children had the highest average monthly
poverty rate (24.5%), episodic poverty rate (32.4%), chronic poverty rate
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to achieve some degree of anonymity concerning her mental health problems. 3
In contrast to mental health problems, treatment by a physician for physical
ailments can often proceed successfully on the basis of a physical examination,
objective information supplied by the patient, and the results of diagnostic tests.
Public disclosure of such treatments rarely creates the type of stigma more
commonly associated with mental illness. Rather obvious exceptions to this
distinction include medical conditions which themselves carry stigmas, such as
sexually-transmitted diseases and the AIDS-causing virus., Additionally, other
medical conditions and diseases - such as drug addiction 5 and alcoholism86 -
may require treatment jointly by physicians and mental health professionals, thus
exposing the patient to potential stigmatization.
Effective psychotherapy, unlike most conventional medical treatment, requires
an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a
frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. 7 Because
of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult
psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during
counseling sessions may cause potential embarrassment or humiliation. For this
reason, the possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential
relationship necessary for successful treatment.8 Sometimes the mere disclosure
that a person is being treated for a mental health problem - regardless of the
mental condition - creates a problem for the patient. The same phenomenon does
not occur with most conventional - that is, non-mental health - medical
treatments.
(9.4%), and entry rate (4.4%).
JULIE A. NICE & LOUISE G. TRUBECK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON POVERTY LAW: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 5 (Supp. 1999).
83 See generally LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1989).
84 See Grace Kathleen Hogan & Nicole Wertz, Privacy, Privilege and theRight to Know:
Disclosure of AIDS/HIV Status in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 11 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 805 (1996); Richard C. Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HIV-
Related Information: An Analytic Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34
VILL. L. REV. 871 (1989); Gary Williams, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: Can
It Protect Private Figures From the Unauthorized Publication of Confidential Medical
Information?, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1 (1997).
85 See generally PHILIP P. MUISENER, UNDERSTANDING AND TREATING ADOLESCENT
SUBSTANCE ABUSE (1994).
86 See generally BRYAN E. ROBINSON & J. LYN RHODEN, WORKING WITH CHILDREN OF
ALCOHOLICS, THE PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1998).
87 See generally Carolyn Peddy Courville, Comment, Rationales for the Confidentiality
ofPsychotherapist-Patient Communications: TestimonialPrivilege and the Constitution, 35
Hous. L. REV. 187 (1998).
8 See id.
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II. CONFIDENTIALITY, PRIVILEGE, AND PRIVACY
Although the terms confidentiality, privilege and privacy are often used
interchangeably, their sources of origin and proper application are very different.
The notion of confidentiality springs from the obligations professionals owe their
patients or clients based upon ethical codes and licensing statutes. 89 Confidentiality
may be viewed as an ethical duty owed by the professional to the patient or client.
The patient ordinarily has the power to waive confidentiality either in writing or
orally, whereas the professional does not ordinarily have the power to waive this
duty.9" In discussing the need to protect confidential records, Myers observes that:
The ethical principles of medicine, nursing, and other professions
require professionals to safeguard confidential information revealed by
patients. The principles of medical ethics of the American Medical
Association require physicians to "safeguard patient confidences within
the constraints of the law." The Hippocratic oath states that "whatsoever
I shall see or hear in the course of my profession... if it be what should
not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be
holy secrets." The Code of Nurses of the American Nurses Association
states that nurses safeguard the patient's right to privacy by carefully
protecting information of a confidential nature."
Both the American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric
Association have authority to enforce the Principles of Medical Ethics against their
members,9 2 while the National Association of Social Workers has its own Code of
Ethics enforceable only against its members.93  Similarly, the American
Psychological Association has a Code of Conduct enforceable only against APA
89 See generally Gerard F. Glynn, MultidisciplinaryRepresentation ofChildren: Conflicts
Over Disclosures of Client Communications, 27 J. MARsHALLL. REv. 617,621-22 (1994).
9' See Audrey Rogers, New Insights on Waiver and the Inadvertent Disclosure of
Privileged Materials: Attorney Responsibility as the Governing Precept, 47 FLA. L. REV.
159, 164 (1995) (discussing the authority to waive confidentiality).
91 John E.B. Myers, Medicolegal Aspects of Child Abuse, in TREATMENT OF CHILD
ABUSE: COMMON GROUND FORMENTALHEALTH, MEDICAL, AND LEGALPRACTITIONERS 313,
319 (Robert M. Reece ed., 2000) (citing American Medical Assoc., Principles of Medical
Ethics, Chicago: American Medical Assoc. 1989; and American Nurses Assoc., Code for
Nurses, Wash. D.C.: American Nurses Assoc., 1985).
92 See American Medical Assoc., Code of Medical Ethics (2001); American Psychiatric
Assoc., The Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to
Psychiatry (2001).
93 See National Association of Social Workers, Code of Ethics, pmbl. (1999), and
National Assoc. of Social Workers, Ethical Review Procedures, Rule 2 (2001).
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members. 94 Each mental health profession is guided by its own separate ethical
code, and the codes may also vary from state to state. 
9
A. Privilege
The notion of privilege is derived from evidentiary rules which prohibit
disclosure of certain communications between a professional and the client or
patient during pretrial proceedings such as depositions, during trials and during
other judicial hearings." There are three requirements which ordinarily attach to
privileges: first, the communication must be between a patient and a professional
with whom privileged communication is recognized under law; second, the patient
must seek professional services; and third, only those communications that the
patient intended to be confidential are considered privileged.97
The types of communications that are considered priveleged are ordinarily
restricted to the professional services which are being provided, and the list of
professionals who owe patients and clients this protection is also limited by statute.
These are provisions which have been enacted by legislative bodies: in the case of
proceedings in federal courts, Congress enacts the rules of evidence; in the case of
state court proceedings, state legislatures enact the state rules of evidence.
Although most states recognize in their evidence codes a physician-patient
privilege, increasing numbers recognize psychotherapist-patient, psychologist-
patient, and social worker-patient privileges as well.9 Wigmore identified four
conditions which must be satisfied before a privilege would be recognized in the
law:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the
parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulouslyfostered.
9' See American Psychological Assoc., Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct, Introduction (2003).
95 LELAND C. SWENSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW FOR THE HELPING PROFESSIONS 59 (2d
ed. 1997).
96 See Scott R. White, Comment, Discovery ofNon-Parties ' MedicalRecords in the Face
of the Physician-Patient Privilege, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 523 (2000).
97 Myers, supra note 91.
98 See GARYB. MELTON ETAL., PSYCHOLOGICALEvALUATIONs FOR THE COURTS 660 (2d
ed. 1997).
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(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation. 9
Although Congress apparently failed to adopt a privilege for communications
between psychotherapists and patients when it enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the United States Supreme Court was willing to create a new common-
law based privilege in the landmark decision of Jaffee v. Redmond. " The Supreme
Court recognized a federal privilege which applies to psychiatrists, psychologists,
and licensed social workers engaged in psychotherapy.'O The Court focused on the
therapist's total dependence upon the willingness and ability of the patient to talk
freely, reasoning that effective psychotherapy requires an "atmosphere of
confidence and trust."'0 2
B. Exceptions to Privilege
Because privileges are derived from rules of evidence which apply to pre-
litigation (that is, depositions) and litigation contexts only, courts recognize
exceptions to privileges. These exceptions suspend the application of the privilege
in narrowly-defined contexts." 3 The application ofevidentiaryprivileges, however,
may be modified by decisions such as the California Supreme Court's ruling in
99 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 527 (John T. McNaughton rev. 1961).
100 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
I id. at 15.
I02 d.at 10. For a discussion of the effects of Jaffe, see generally Christopher B. Mueller,
The Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee: Truth and Other Values in a
Therapeutic Age, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 945 (1998); Melissa L. Nelken, The Limits ofPrivilege:
The Developing Scope of Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Law, 20 REV. LMo. 1
(2000); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v.
Redmond: Where Do We Go From Here?, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 1341 (1998); Lynda Womack
Kenney, Note, Role ofIaffee v. Redmond's "Course ofDiagnosis or Treatment" Condition
in Preventing Abuse of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 35 GA. L. REv. 345 (2000).
103 Although this notion of limiting the application of exceptions to evidentiary privileges
is generally true, many commentators have suggested recently that exceptions to evidentiary
privileges should be increased or broadened, or that courts should clearly define and adopt
standards forwaiver of the privilege. See generallyEvidence-EvidentiaryPrivilege- First
Circuit Recognizes Crime-Fraud Exception to Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege- In Re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 1999), 113 HARv. L.
REv. 1539 (2000); Jack Achiezer Guggenheim & AaronD. Werbel, Confidentially Speaking:
Why the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Should Include Employee Assistance Program
("EAP") Counselors, 68 U. OF Mo. KAN. Cry L. REv. 29 (1999); Alexandra P. West,
Comment, ImplyingPlaintiffs' Waivers ofthe Psychotherapist-Patient PrivilegeAfter Jaffee
v. Redmond, 59 U. PrrT. L. REv. 901 (1998).
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Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 104 where the court created a duty for
therapists to warn third parties of dangers posed by therapists' patients. Thus, in
limited circumstances, a therapist may feel compelled to disclose that the patient
poses a danger to the public," 5 but this duty may not apply to forensic evaluators.
Several commentators have observed that although:
[M]ost jurisdictions now recognize a Tarasoff-type duty, the vast
majority that do limit it to situations in which . . . "the patient has
communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical
violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims." Moreover,
application of the duty to therapists does not necessarily mean it also
applies to evaluators, even in those situations where the attorney-client
privilege would permit disclosure. A person does not normally have a
legal obligation to help another unless he or she stands in a "special
relationship" to that person. Tarasofffound that the therapist does have
such a relationship with potential victims of patients, in part because the
therapist's involvement with and control over the party's potential
assailant is "significant," and in part because... the therapist possesses
expertise in predicting who may be violent. But the evaluator may not
have as much contact with the subject of an evaluation as a therapist
does with a patient; moreover, malpractice law has traditionally made a
distinction between "treating" and "examining" doctors and placed less
of a duty on the latter. "
Perhaps most importantly, the enactment of mandatory child abuse reporting
laws' o7 has created a mechanism which overrides both the ethical duties of
professionals to protect confidential communications and the legal privilege
applicable in legal proceedings,'0" which shield from disclosure communications
between professionals and their patients and/or clients."°
"m 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
'05 See Fay Anne Freedman, The Psychiatrist 's Dilemma: Protect the Public or Safeguard
Individual Liberty?, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 255 (1988); Vanessa Merton,
Confidentiality and the "Dangerous "Patient: Implications oJTarasoffforPsychiatrists and
Lawyers, 31 EMORY L. J. 263 (1982); D.L. Rosenhan et al., Warning Third Parties: The
Ripple Effects ofTarasoff, 24 PAC. L. J. 1165 (1993).
106 MELTON E AL., supra note 98, at 76-77.
107 See Brian G. Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse at the
Future: A CriticalAnalysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.-
KErT L. REv. 641 (1977).
'08 See Elizabeth Anderson et al., Consequences and Dilemmas in Therapeutic
Relationships with Families Resulting from Mandatory Reporting Legislation, 14 LAW &
POL'Y 241 (1992).
"0 Myers, supra note 91, at 324.
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C. Privacy Rights
The legal notion of privacy rights has evolved from statutory, common law, and
constitutional rights."' The right to privacy has been described as "a sweeping
concept, encompassing (among other things) freedom of thought, control over one's
body, solitude in one's home, control over information about oneself, freedom from
surveillance, protection of one's reputation, and protection from searches and
interrogations.""' The constitutional basis for privacy rights in non-criminal
matters has been recognized in cases such as Griswoldv. Connecticut,"2 Eisenstadt
v. Baird," I3 and Roe v. Wade, 4 involving reproductive freedom, then expanded into
a right to informational privacy in Whalen v. Roe."' Although the Supreme Court
in Whalen expressly refused to hold that there was a constitutional right to privacy
in medical records, many subsequent lower court decisions appear to rely upon the
case as though it had recognized such a constitutionally based privacy right." 6 Of
course, such a privacy interest has been recognized for adults, while it remains
unclear whether minors will be successful in asserting such a privacy right.
Privacy rights have also evolved from cases involving challenges to unlawful
searches and seizures in criminal matters.' The often used "reasonable
expectation of privacy" standard, applied in the context of the Fourth Amendment,
dates to Justice Harlan's 1967 concurring opinion in Katz v. United States." The
Supreme Court has rarely explored the application of children's privacy interests
based on the Constitution." 9 Children's privacy interests and their reasonable
"o See Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977); Ken
Gormley, One Hundred Years ofPrivacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335 (1992); Robert C. Post,
Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEo. L.J. 2087 (2001).
"' Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2002).
112 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas stated in his opinion that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations ftom those guarantees that help
give them life and substance." Id. at 484. This created a substantive due process right to
privacy while invalidating a state law prohibiting the use of contraceptive drugs or devices
and counseling or aiding and abetting the use of contraceptives. Id.
" 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives
to unmarried persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution).
114 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating a Texas law prohibiting abortions, and holding that,
although a woman's rights were not absolute, her right to elect an abortion does have real and
substantial protection as an exercise of her liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
16 See Glover & Toll, supra note 11, at 540.
"17 See generally Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002).
"8 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (lIarlan, J., concurring).
" See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children's Rights:
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expectations of privacy, however, in the context of searches performed on school
premises and involving school drug testing programs12 have been limited by the
Supreme Court's decisions in New Jersey v. TLO,121 Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton,12 and Board of Education v. Earls.123  These decisions have not
recognized any prevailing right to privacy enjoyed by minors when allegations of
Fourth Amendment rights violations have been raised. 24
Incorporating Emerging Human Rights Into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1 (1999). Woodhouse argues that:
Children have few clearly articulated or firmly established constitutional rights
in the United States of America. Children enjoy few independent rights outside
the context of criminal or administrative proceedings, because children's rights
(generally called "interests") are conceptualized as subsumed within the rights
of parents. Children's interests are defined by parents, who exercise their
constitutionally protected rights to physical custody and control of children's
upbringing. Children have succeeded in asserting rights in various narrow areas,
which are confined primarily to criminal procedure and equal protection law and
based entirely in decisional doctrines rather than text .... They enjoy no federal
constitutional rights to education or to programs of protection from abuse and
exploitation, and no rights to the basic nutrition, income supports, shelter, and
health care on which the right to life obviously depends.
Id. at 8-9.
120 See Jason E. Yearout, Note, Individualized School Searches and the Fourth
Amendment: What's a SchoolDistrict to Do?, 10 WM. & MARY BiLL RTs. J. 489 (2002).
121 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., the Court allowed a warrantless search in a school
setting of a 14-year-old student's purse following a teacher's observation of the minor
smoking in a restroom. The Court ruled that probable cause for the search was unnecessary.
Id. at 341. Thus, the expectation of privacy for adults and juveniles is clearly different. See
Sunil H. Mansukhani, School Searches After New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Are There Any Limits?,
34 U. LouIsviuE J. FAM. L. 345 (1995-96); Robert E. Shepard, Jr., School Searches After
T.L.O. and Veronia School District, 13 CRIM. JUST. 45,45 (1998) ("[A] standard lower than
probable cause - articulated as reasonable grounds or reasonable suspicion - governs
school searches, and a violation of school rules as well as violations of the law may provide
the impetus for the search. This is obviously a looser predicate than would apply with adults
'2 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding a warrantless, suspicionless drug-testing program for
high school students participating in interscholastic sports). The Court ruled that the minors
had diminished expectations of privacy because of their status as custodians of the state
acting in loco parentis, and because of the unemancipated minors' lack of the fundamental
rights of self determination, not to mention their voluntary participation in sports programs.
Id. at 655-57. "Traditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack
some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination - including even the right to
liberty in its narrow sense .... They are subject, even as to their physical freedom, to the
control of their parents or guardians." Id. at 654.
"3 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (validating school policy of testing all students who participate
in extra-curricular activities for drug use).
" See George M. Dery, III, The Coarsening of Our National Manners: The Supreme
Court's Failure to Protect Privacy Interests of Schoolchildren - Vemonia School District
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Although the United States Constitution does not expressly codify a right to
privacy, approximately ten states and the District of Columbia have enacted explicit
rights of privacy provisions in their constitutions.'25 It is difficult to predict how
these specific enactments will be applied to protect minors. The application of a
state-constitutionally-based right to privacy seems unlikely to expand to protect
juvenile mental health records in dependency proceedings. 2 6 Because the patients
are minors, the right to privacy is far more restricted than the right of adult patients,
and guardians likely will have the right to waive such privacy rights of their minor
wards or children.'27 Additionally, in the case ofjuveniles' therapy or mental health
records which result from court-ordered interventions, the application of any
privacy right theory would be balanced against the needs of the State to provide
protection for children in dependency cases, or against the need to comply with a
direct court order which seeks information about a party to pending litigation.
If the juvenile court has legitimate jurisdiction over the lives of children in
dependency proceedings, the court must be free to evaluate and order necessary
services for those children and to monitor the effectiveness of those services. If
juveniles had an unqualified right of privacy 8 that effectively barred courts from
ordering mental evaluations or reports from therapists, dependency courts would be
marginalized in their ability to assess and order mental health treatment for children
in their custody.
Rather than turning to the Constitution as a basis to assert some type of privacy
protection over mental health records, 9 it seems more likely that statutory
47J v. Acton, 29 SuFFoLKU. L. REV. 693 (1995);Meg Penrose, Shedding Rights, Shredding
Rights: A Critical Examination of Students' Privacy Rights and the "Special Needs"
Doctrine After Earls, 3 NEV. L. J. 411 (2003); Rosemary Spellman, Comment, Strip Search
ofJuveniles and the Fourth Amendment: A Delicate Balance ofProtection and Privacy, 22
J. Juv. L. 159, 162 (2001-02); Stuart C. Berman, Note, Student Fourth Amendment Rights:
Defining the Scope of the T.L.O. School-Search Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1077 (1991).
12' See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1
(amended 1972); D.C. CONST. art. I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6;
ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (amended 1972); MoNT. CONST. art. II, §
10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
,26 At least one federal circuit has rejected the recognition of juveniles having
informational privacy rights based on the Constitution in a class action suit against ajuvenile
court for its practice of compiling and disclosing social histories about juvenile offenders.
See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that, absent some clear
indication from the Supreme Court, "the Constitution does not encompass a general right to
nondisclosure of private information").
.2 Seegenerally JEFFREYROSEN, THEUNwANTEDGAzE: THEDESTRUCTION OFPRIVACY
IN AMERICA (2000) (discussing the law of data protection and computer security).
128 See Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989) (discussing the necessity oflimitations on
the right of privacy).
"29 But see Ferguson v. City ofCharleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (holding that regardless
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enactments have greater potential to shield juvenile mental health records from
disclosure. The federal regulations enacted under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") 3° are based on the presumption that medical
records are entitled to protection because of patients' privacy rights."' It is too
soon to know whether this enactment will restrict disclosure ofcourt-ordered mental
health evaluations, or whether it even applies to the records of minors.'32 Other
statutory enactments might be viewed as creating privacy protections for patients'
medical records,'33 but such protections would likely not extend to mental health
records made in compliance with court orders. Absent the passage of statutory
provisions at the state or federal level which grant explicit recognition to the
privacy rights of juvenile mental health records, children's advocates have little
hope of advancing an argument that their clients have identifiable privacy rights
134
- separate and apart from the recognition given to the rights of adults - in this
area.
Ill. THE IMPACT OF DISCLOSING CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS IN THE
COURSE OF LITIGATION
As the director of a law school affiliated clinical program which represents
children, the author has litigated a number of cases where children's mental health
records have become the focus of litigation. Often, with no prior notice to the child
of whether the right to privacy is protected by the Constitution, the "reasonable expectation
of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the
results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent").
130 See generally Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-91, § 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). The Privacy Rule is codified in 45 C.F.R. § 164.
"' See Glover & Toll, supra note 11.
3 See Jack A. Rovner et al., Managing the Privacy Challenge: Compliance with the
Amended HIPAA Privacy Rule, 15 HEALTH LAW. 18 (2002); Nick Littlefield & Colin Zick,
HIPAA: New Federal Privacy Rules and Their Implications, 46 B. B.J. 14 (2002).
" For instance, medical records constitute "records" accorded protection under the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000), where they include a patient's medical history, clinical
findings and recommended therapeutic interventions. Williams v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,
104 F.3d 670, 673 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1150 (1999) (holding that for
purposes of the Privacy Act, one descriptive item about an individual constitutes a "record").
'" See, e.g., Benjamin F. Sidbury, Gonzaga University v. Doe and Its Implications: No
Right To Enforce Student Privacy Rights Under FERPA, 29 J.C. & U.L. 655 (2003)
(discussing the Supreme Court's decision which foreclosed private enforcement by a person
whose educational records were improperly disclosed in violation of the Family Education
Rights & Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000)). See generally Lynn M. Daggett,
Bucking Up Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records Statute Work, 46 CATH. U. L.
REV. 617 (1997); Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Buckley H: Using Civil Rights Claims to
Enforce the Federal Student Records Statute, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 29 (1997) (discussing
the difficulty of enforcing FERPA to protect student records).
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or the child's counsel, the mental health professional has been called to testify about
ongoing evaluations or therapy, 5 often in the patient's presence. Frequently,
witnesses other than the mental health professional have been questioned about the
child's treatment or diagnosis, the impressions of the mental health expert, or the
recommended regimen of therapy.
Despite state evidence codes which ordinarily preclude the introduction of
hearsay testimony at trial, the numerous hearsay exceptions recognized by the law'36
create myriad opportunities for a child's mental health records or statements made
to a therapist or evaluator to be admitted in a juvenile proceeding.' Additionally,
after a child has been adjudicated dependent, many jurisdictions relax the
application of evidentiary rules which might otherwise restrict the admissibility of
children's mental health records.' This is not uncommon in a legal system which
is so dependent on the testimony of social workers charged with the responsibility
of providing for the needs of children in state custody.
Because the system tends to be underfinanced, it often relies on social workers
to report the findings, conclusions and recommendations of mental health
professionals.'39 This is not to suggest that social workers are inadequate therapists,
or that they are insensitive to the need for confidentiality of information learned
when children enter the legal system. To the contrary, social workers often spend
far more time providing therapeutic services to children than other licensed
therapists. However, the primary reliance upon social workers injuvenile litigation
is the result of concentrating resources on the payment of mental health
professionals to provide mental health services, not to testify in court. It is also
permitted because most courts relax their evidentiary code prohibitions against
"' For a discussion about the limitations ofpsychiatric and psychological evaluations and
suggestions of strategies for challenging the "final product" of these mental evaluations, see
generally, 1 JAY ZISKIN, Challenging the Results & Conclusions of Psychiatric &
Psychological Evaluations, in COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICALTESTIMONY
380 (5th ed. 1995).
' See generally 2 JoHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES,
§ 7.1 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing the importance of hearsay in child abuse litigation).
1' This author is not condoning the relaxation of all evidentiary rules in juvenile
proceedings. There are serious questions about the actual reliability of details in some
statements children make to professionals during interviews because of the limitations of
interviewers' abilities to recall specific information. See Amye R. Warren & Cara E.
Woodall, The Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: How Well Do Interviewers Recall Their
Interviews With Children?, 5 PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L. 355 (1999).
' See Krista MacNevin Jee, Comment, Hearsay Exceptions in Child Abuse Cases: Have
the Courts andLegislatures Really Considered the Child?, 19 WHrTrIER L. REV. 559 (1998)
(addressing the issues a court considers when balancing a defendant's constitutional rights
and the court's interest in protecting evidence).
' See Lucy S. McGough, Hearing and Believing Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L.
485 (1999) (discussing the admission of social workers' hearsay testimony).
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hearsay testimony"4 in the post adjudication stage of dependency proceedings.
Thus, there may be a social worker who provides mental health services in the case,
but even if another licensed professional actually treated the child, a different social
worker may actually testify in court about the status of the mental health treatment,
because that social worker is likely to be the caseworker assigned to the case.
Additionally, many jurisdictions allow such testimony to be admitted as exceptions
to traditional hearsay rules under the diagnosis or treatment hearsay exception,""
or because the rules of evidence may be relaxed in post-adjudicatory stages of the
juvenile proceeding.142
Even in jurisdictions where such juvenile proceedings are closed to the public
- and there is an increasing amount of pressure to open up juvenile proceedings
up to the general public 43 - such disclosures may be - at the very least -
sources of great embarrassment for the child patient. In one case where the Tulane
Law Clinic represented an adolescent client, the client attempted suicide following
disclosure by the client's therapist that the client had been diagnosed with HIV.
The client had been diagnosed a year earlier, but seemed to adjust to her medical
status. She maintained control and discretion over who was told about her status.
0o Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801 (C).
' See John J. Capowski, An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Statements to Mental Health
Professionals Under the Diagnosis or Treatment Hearsay Exception, 33 GA L. REV. 353,
361-62 (1999) (discussing the diagnosis hearsay exception); Robert R. Rugani, Jr., Comment,
The Gradual Decline of a Hearsay Exception: The Misapplication of Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(4), The MedicalDiagnosis Hearsay Exception, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 867
(1999) (discussing the federal courts' application of the diagnosis hearsay exception).
142 Relaxing the evidentiary hearsay prohibitions in child abuse cases has taken on a life
of its own in criminal prosecutions. See Lynne Celander DeSarbo, The Danger of Value-
Laden Investigation in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Are Defendants' Constitutional Rights
Violated When Mental Health Professionals Offer Testimony Based On Children's Hearsay
Statements and Behaviors?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 276 (1999); Jean Montoya, Child Hearsay
Statutes: At Once Over-Inclusive and Under-Inclusive, 5 PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L. 304
(1999); William Wesley Patton, Evolution in Child Abuse Litigation: The Theoretical Void
Where Evidentiary and Procedural Worlds Collide, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1009 (1992).
141 See Joshua M. Dalton, At the Crossroads of Richmond and Gault: Addressing Media
Access to Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings Through a Functional Analysis, 28 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1155 (1998); Gordon A. Martin, Jr., Open the Doors: A Judicial Call to End
Confidentiality in DelinquencyProceedings, 21 NEW ENG. J. ONCRim. &Civ. CONFINEMENT
393 (1995); Shannon F. Mclatchey, Media Access to Juvenile Records: In Search of a
Solution, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 337 (1999); Susan S. Greenebaum, Note, ConditionalAccess
to Juvenile Court Proceedings: A PriorRestraint or a Viable Solution?, 44 WASH. U. J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 135 (1993); Danielle R. Oddo, Note, Removing Confidentiality Protections
and the "Get Tough " Rhetoric: What Has Gone Wrong With the Juvenile Justice System?,
18 B.C. THmD WoRLD L.J. 105 (1998).
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This information was somehow disseminated to the client's teacher, and then
apparently to the client's classmates. The client's suicidal ideation did not appear
to develop until she lost control and power over disclosure of her medical status.
Suicidal ideation is a major concern for mental health professionals who work
with children and adolescents. Each year more than 2,000 American teenagers
commit suicide, a rate that has more than doubled since the 1960s.'" Although
suicide is the eighth leading cause of death for all Americans, it is the third leading
cause of death for young people aged fifteen to twenty-four." 5 Suicidal ideation is
not only more common among severely physically abused and sexually abused
children, but the pathology continues well past childhood.'"
If the child has disclosed information under the assumption that the disclosure
will remain in confidence, the very foundation necessary for therapeutic trust has
been eroded. Compelling the therapist to disclose the child's communications in
the child's presence may preclude any future effective therapy with the testifying
therapist. The Supreme Court's Jaffee v. Redmond decision recognized that issues
discussed in mental health therapy are so sensitive that "the mere possibility of
disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for
successful treatment."' 47 Indeed, the child who perceives such disclosure as an act
of betrayal on the part of the therapist may thereafter maintain suspicion of any
other therapist as well. The consequences may eliminate the potential benefits of
therapeutic intervention for that particular child. Although attitudinal barriers
against communicating with therapists may not appear to create a major problem
in the eyes of some, it may actually contribute to the ongoing social problem of
intergenerational child abuse.'"
Additionally, the impact of the disclosure may create a barrier when the child
discusses the case with other professionals. The child patient whose "confidential"
communications with his therapist have been disclosed may well be justified in
deciding that no communications with professionals are truly confidential. Such a
'" See Andrea Sachs, Catching Teens in Time, TIME, May 15, 2000, available at
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview.
141 CDC unpublished mortality data from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS)
Mortality DataTapes, athttp://www.edc.gov/ncicp/factsheets/suifacts.htra (last modified Jan.
28,2000).
4 See Susan L. Bryant & Lillian M. Range, Type And Severity of Child Abuse and
College Students' Lifetime Suicidality, 21 CHuD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1169-70 (1997)
(Physical and/or sexual abuse victims are four to seven times more likely to have suicidal
thoughts and attempts than nonabused teens).
'41 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
14S See Christine M. Kreklewetz & Caroline C. Piotrowski, Incest Survivor Mothers:
Protecting the Next Generation, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1305 (1998) ("Paradoxically,
the children of incest survivor mothers are at high risk for sexual abuse, yet mothers are
rarely perpetrators themselves. Therefore, an important issue for both mothers and clinicians
alike is the protection and prevention of sexual victimization of the next generation.").
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
child may be inhibited from communicating with legal counsel, physicians, nurses
and, social workers, in addition to the child's therapist. Once the child's trust is
compromised, attempting to provide effective mental health treatment maybe futile.
It may be incumbent on the therapist to recognize the potential harm to the patient
and to request direction from the court.
Of course, if the child is represented by counsel, the child's attorney should be
the party to make such a request. Unfortunately, the child's counsel may be the
party responsible for calling the therapist to the stand and posing the questions in
the first place.)49  Limitations on statutory discovery in post-adjudication
proceedings may impede counsel's opportunities to access information in advance
of court hearings. As a result, the child's counsel may be in the difficult position
of questioning the mental health expert with limited or no prior information about
the status of the child's treatment. Of course, an attorney for any party may call the
therapist to the stand and question the mental health professional about the patient's
evaluation or therapy, thus leaving the door open to compromising the child's
confidential communications, at least within the context of the court hearing.
It may be worthwhile to require a preliminary hearing before allowing
children's mental health professionals to testify about the child's disclosures or
condition. The court may not find it necessary for the child's therapist to disclose
in detail what is occurring in the professional relationship. Further, if in the
therapist's professional opinion it would be detrimental to the patient's recovery or
treatment to disclose otherwise confidential information, such testimony should be
offered in to the record before allowing the therapist to testify. Restricting the
scope of the therapist's testimony may preserve the therapeutic relationship. 0 The
difficulty with implementing such a process, however, is that it might be time
consuming. Courts might be reluctant to add yet another layer of litigation to their
already clogged dockets. Additionally, requiring therapists to appear for some type
of preliminary hearing and the scheduled hearing takes time and probably increases
' Much has been written about the poor quality of representation children receive in the
nation's juvenile court system. See generally A Report of the American Bar Association
Presidential Working Group on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children and Their Families,
America's Children at Risk, A National Agenda for Legal Action (1993); Patricia Puritz et
al., Due Process Advocacy Project Report: Seeking Better Representation for Young
Offenders, 10 CRIM. JUST. 14 (1996); Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The
Best Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 79 (1997).
"o One group of experts notes that reports of forensic mental health evaluations are quite
different from reports prepared for use in traditional clinical settings, in part because:
[T]he substance of the report is more likely to become public knowledge, as part
of a court record, through word-of-mouth statements of courtroom spectators or
through media coverage of court proceedings. Thus, special care must be taken
to minimize any infringement on the privacy rights of persons mentioned in the
report.
MELTON ET AL., supra note 98, at 523.
[Vol. 12:511
2004] CONFIDENTIALITY AND JUVENILE MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS 541
the professional fees charged. This might ultimately reduce the availability of
therapists willing to participate in such court proceedings, if they view each court
hearing as a potentially time consuming process which reduces their available time
for their other patients. However, such a process might also help ensure that the
therapist is able to balance the demands of the court system with the therapist's
duties and obligations to the juvenile patient without compromising either role.
If the court is unwilling for whatever reason to restrict the scope of the
therapist's testimony, the consequences to the child should be balanced against the
prospect of having the child present in the courtroom when the disclosure is made.
If the child has disclosed suicidal or homicidal ideation in the course of therapy,' 5'
having such information openly disclosed in the child's presence in court may
greatly exacerbate the child's already difficult plight' 52 Of course, if such
information is withheld altogether from the court, the opportunity to ensure
appropriate therapeutic response, or to ensure the protection of third parties or even
the child herself, may have been lost. In any event, should it be necessary to
disclose such information during a juvenile court proceeding, shielding the child
from a public disclosure should be of paramount importance to the child's legal
representative and the child's therapist.
IV. AMBIGUITIES IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING FOR CHILD CLIENTS IN
DEPENDENCY CASES
One of the recurring issues attorneys face when representing minors is the legal
concept of autonomy. Who ultimately has the authority and legal capacity to make
decisions on behalf of children involved in legal proceedings?' Although this
'.. See George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege: The Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV. 33 (1999).
..2 This focuses on the consequences ofdisclosure alone, not on the possible consequences
of the suicidal or homicidal ideation. Obviously, a juvenile making such serious disclosures
should be closely monitored. But some children make such statements seeking attention, and
not intending to act upon their threats. The difficulty, of course, is knowing when to take such
statements seriously and to respond appropriately.
' The changing legal definition ofchildhood has contributed to the issue. Commentators
have observed that:
The belief that adolescents are as capable as adults of making decisions about
their fives also contributed to the attack on laws governing hospitalization for
children. Little concerted attention was given to whether twenty-one was the
most appropriate age for assumption of adult privileges and responsibilities until
the Vietnam War, when the voting age was reduced from twenty-one to eighteen.
Consideration of this issue evidently stimulated a reassessment of age
requirements for other "adult" rights: the vast majority of states adopted eighteen
as the maximum age of minority for almost all purposes shortly after the twenty-
sixth amendment was ratified.
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appears to be a fairly straightforward question which can be resolved by turning to
the minor's parent or guardian," 4 the issue has become more complicated over
time. ' In one jurisdiction, children under the age often are incompetent to testify
in court - unless they are victims of specific sexual abuse crimes - but they are
eligible to be transferred to courts of general jurisdiction to be tried as adults.'56 In
other words, they cannot give reliable testimony in court, but they can form the
requisite mens rea to commit murder.
As children are increasingly the subjects of dependency legal proceedings, the
parent's or legal guardian's relationship with the child may be radically altered. If
the parent or guardian is accused of neglecting or abusing the child, then the
parent's ability to make decisions about the child's life may be called into question.
Legally, one might assume that even after a parent has been accused of neglecting
or abusing the child, that an accusation alone would not be sufficient reason to
deprive a parent's authority over his or her own child. However, some jurisdictions
call for the immediate appointment of guardians ad litem to function in much the
same legal capacity as a parent, thus relieving the natural parent of decision-making
autonomy over the child."5 7
In many traditional legal settings, a lawyer who represents a minor as a client
might turn to the minor's parents for direction about the objectives of the legal
representation. However, in most dependency proceedings, the state has intervened
in the family's life under the doctrine ofparens patriae, 8 and the underlying reason
Elyce H. Zenoff& Alan B. Zients, If Civil Commitment is the Answerfor Children, WhatAre
the Questions?, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 171, 182 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
"54 In Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court recognized that "'[i]t is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. "' 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
... See generally Robert Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-Making
Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 285 (1976) (describing the
allocation of legal responsibility for a child's medical care decisions among parents, the
child, medical practitioners, and the state).
156 Jacqueline Cuncannan, Note, Only When They're Bad: The Rights andResponsibilities
ofOur Children, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 273,290 n.82 (1997) (citing Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 491.060(2), 211.071.1 (1996)).
" See generally Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem As Surrogate Parents:
Implications for Role Definition and Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (1996)
(describing the role and responsibilities of guardians ad litem).
's' The term "parens patriae" literally means "parent of the country," and:
[It] refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of
persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane .... and in child
custody determinations, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests
of the child. It is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take
care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their
parents.
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for the intervention is that the child has been neglected or abused. It would be
anomalous for the child's attorney to turn to the parents for direction about the
objectives of representation in such a scenario. 59 Haralambie addresses the issue
by identifying the party with authority to waive the child's rights:
It is not clear in most jurisdictions who has the authority to waive
confidentiality for children. Parents usually have authority to waive the
psychologist-patient or physician-patient privilege. In cases involving
appointed counsel for the child, it is likely that the child and parents are
at least procedurally adverse. In child abuse and neglect cases, the
interests may be factually adverse also. A number of courts have held
therefore that, in such cases, parents may lose their rights to waive
professional privileges on behalf of their children; the child's attorney
or guardian ad litem may then have the authority to assert or waive
privileges on behalf ofthe child. Where the custodial parent and child's
attorney have the same substantive position in the case (for example,
when only one parent has abused the child, and the other parent is
protecting the child), the custodial parent should sign an authorization,
even if it is duplicative or unnecessary."6
If the parent directed the attorney to make every effort to defeat the legal
proceedings, then the purpose behind the appointment of independent counsel for
a child in a dependency proceeding would surely be defeated.' Nonetheless, many
jurisdictions ignore this issue until after the child has been adjudicated dependent.
That is, the parents' legal rights are somehow suspended until there is a judicial
determination that the child has been neglected or abused. If the child is
immediately placed in the custody of the state at the time of the filing of the
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
' See Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75
MARQ. L. REv. 569,592-99 (1992) (calling into question the "presumption that parents will
consistently act in the best interests of their children").
'60 ANN M. RH miE, TECILD's ATTORNEY, A GLIDETO REPRESENTING CHILDREN
IN CUSTODY, ADOPTION, AND PROTECTION CASES 58 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
"' See Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counselfor Children
in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571 (1996). Ross argued, "[F]irst, ... that the
interests of children and theirparents do not necessarily coincide." Id. at 1582. "Second, that
parents may not be motivated by their children's needs and interests." Id. at 1584. And
"[t]hird, parents and state guardians do not and cannot always speak for their children, even
if they are well-motivated and believe that their interests coincide with the child's." Id. at
1585; see also George H. Russ, Through the Eyes ofa Child, "GregoryK ": A Child's Right
to be Heard, 27 FAm. L.Q. 365 (1993) (discussion by the adoptive father of an 11-year-old
boy who sued in his own name to terminate the rights of his biological parents, and to allow
his foster parents to adopt him).
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dependency petition, then the parents' rights over the child may be suspended and
a legal guardian would be vested with the type of authority normally enjoyed by the
parent. If the jurisdiction fails to provide for a temporary award of guardianship
over the child, however, the child's attorney might actually be bound by the
decisions made by the very parents'62 accused of neglecting or abusing the child in
the first place.
V. THE ATTORNEY'S ETHICAL DUTIES
Yet another factor which adds to the complication is the ethical duty and
obligation of the child's counsel. Because the ethics codes governing the conduct
of lawyers were drafted with adult clients in mind, few specific provisions currently
exist which regulate the ethical representation of child clients. '63 Despite the efforts
of the American Bar Association to draft a specific ethics code applicable to child
dependency litigation (the Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent
Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases), '"no state supreme court has yet adopted the
ABA-proposed ethics code. Nevertheless, the ABA Standards "express a clear
preference for the appointment" of a lawyer who takes the role of the child's
attorney, which is defined as "a lawyer who provides legal services for a child and
who owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent
representation to the child as [are] due an adult client.' 65
162 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that the fundamental right to
family integrity is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment); Pierce
v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a parent has a fundamental
constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of a child); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a parent has a fundamental constitutional right in directing
the upbringing and education of his/her child).
'63 See generally Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, "IKnow the Child is My
Client, But Who Am I?", 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1917, 1951 (1996) ("Although attorney
activities are regulated by the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, commentators have observed that neither the
Code nor the Rules adequately address the special problems of child advocates.").
"6 ProposedAmerican BarAssociation Standards ofPracticeforLawyers Who Represent
Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 29 FAM. L.Q. 375 (1995). These Standards were
approved by the ABA Family Law Section in August, 1995, and then by the ABA House of
Delegates in February, 1996. Linda D. Elrod, An Analysis of the Proposed Standards of
Practice for Lawyers Representing Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1999,2002(1996).
65 The American Bar Association's Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent
Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases (1996), at §§ A-1, A-2, available at
http://www.abanet.org/child/childrep.html.
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Because of the failure ofjurisdictions to adopt the ABA Standards of Practice,
one might reasonably assume that a child's counsel should continue to turn to the
child's parent or legal guardian for direction in making decisions about the child's
legal problems. 1 6 The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility Ethical
Consideration 7.12 provided that "[i]f a client under disability has no legal
representative, his lawyermaybe compelled in court proceedings to make decisions
on behalf of the client."' 67 The more recently enacted Model Rules of Professional
Conduct offer not much more clarity in Rule 1.14(b) which provides that "[a]
lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action...
only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in
the client's own interest."'168 Clearly, states need to adopt provisions which sever
the legal autonomy of parents who are accused of neglecting or abusing their own
children, at least until a legal determination has been made that the child may be
safely returned to the family, or that the child should remain in the protective
custody of the state.
Similarly, states should consider amending current legal ethics codes to provide
for those situations in which an attorney must provide representation for a child in
a dependency proceeding, but where the parental rights have not been terminated. 69
If a child has been removed from her family under suspicion that she was subject
to abuse or neglect, that child's attorney should not be faced with any ambiguity as
to who makes decisions immediately on behalf of the child. Moreover, the attorney
should not have to unravel his or her ethical duties to the child because of the
ambiguities of the current ethics codes.
Additionally, at least twenty-two jurisdictions have enacted laws which require
attorneys to report child abuse, 70 thus creating a potential conflict for the lawyer
who attempts to honor attorney-client privileged information on this issue. An
additional pressure for counsel to comply with the mandatory reporting statutes 7'
166 See generally Report of the Working Group on the Allocation ofDecision Making, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1325 (1996) (discussing who should make a child-client's decision in legal
proceedings).
167 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSBILrrY EC 7-12 (1980).
'68 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2003).
169 On the issue of legal proceedings to terminate parental rights, see generally Donald C.
Bross, Terminating the Parent-Child Legal Relationship As A Response to Child Sexual
Abuse, 26 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 287 (1995).
171 See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client
Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 208
(1992) (noting that although the statutes typically apply to the general public, including
lawyers, only a few statutes require lawyers in particular to report child abuse).
171 See Ellen Marrnus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes,
Confidentiality, andJuvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGALETHicS 509 (1998) (describing
the tension between child abuse reporting statutes and attorney-client privilege).
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is the prospect of criminal sanctions as well as civil liability for failing to report
suspected child abuse cases.'72 However, as one author has noted:
Even in states where lawyers are not mandated reporters, the
significance of the confidentiality duty is undermined by the fact that,
lawyer aside, the child is not in control of his own private information.
In most cases, parents, even those whose children have been removed
from their care, have a right to access a child's mental health records,
school reports, and child welfare records (which may include
information about a child's fear of his parents, his desire to be adopted,
or other private information only indirectly related to the court
procedure, such as his drug use and sexual activity). Moreover, no
confidentiality rule confines disclosure by the parents, so they are free
to share this information, as well as any secrets told to them by their
children, with anyone they please.'73
While an abuse/neglect complaint is under investigation, or at least before the
court has entered a judgment that the child is dependent or neglected or abused, the
child's attorney must be able to consult with an adult who has legal authority to
make decisions on behalf of the child, pending the court's determination."'
Although most jurisdictions appoint lawyers or guardians ad litem for children in
dependency proceedings,' many jurisdictions have failed to address the issue of
who has legal autonomy and decision-making capability for the child prior to the
adjudication. If the evidence sustains an adjudication, then the guardian or the
state's representative will be cloaked with such legal autonomy. Whereas, if the
evidence is not sufficient and the court does not adjudicate the child dependent,
then the legal autonomy presumptively returns to the minor's parents or legal
guardians.
172 See Steven J. Singley, Comment, Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse: Civil
Liability ofMandatedReporters, 19 J. Juv. L. 23 6 (1998) (arguing that the imposition of civil
liability on mandated reporters is counterproductive to protecting children, and that existing
criminal sanctions provide adequate protection for children at risk).
17 Emily Buss, "You're My What? " The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their
Lawyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1729-30 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
14 See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN Er AL, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 111-12
(1979) (suggesting that parents must be presumed to act in the best interest of their children,
unless and until they are disqualified by a court of law, and this presumption is necessary to
preserve both family integrity and parental autonomy).
17' For a discussion of the differences in the roles and ethical duties of attorneys and
guardians ad litem for children, see Buss, supra note 173.
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VI. MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS' NEED TO OBTAIN PATIENT, PARENTAL, OR
GUARDIAN CONSENT TO DISCLOSE
Given the difficulties and complications faced by the child's counsel, consider
now the added problems which confront mental health professionals who provide
services for children involved in dependency proceedings. In general, judges tend
to give tremendous deference to the testimony and recommendations of mental
health experts,'76 and these experts play a major role in the daily operations of the
nation's juvenile dependency systems. Lawyers may turn to mental health experts
for science-based precision in their opinions, an unrealistic expectation at best. One
critic indicates:
Diagnosis of psychopathology in children and adolescents is imprecise
and unreliable. As a result, formal criteria for the admission ofjuveniles
into inpatient psychiatric facilities have not yet been developed by either
the American Psychiatric Association or the American Psychological
Association. Although various professional and accrediting
organizations have promulgated their own standards, the lack of
scientific guidance has resulted in variegated admissions criteria among
inpatient facilities.' 7
Assuming that the mental health professional satisfies the court's scrutiny as an
expert witness under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' 8 the court
may request evaluations, therapy, recommendations and opinions as to what is in
the child's best interests in dependency proceedings.' 9 Some ofthese professionals
have treated their child patients before the legal dependency proceedings were
initiated; thus, they have pre-existing relationships with their patients.' 0 Other
176 See Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing
Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity inMentalDisabilityLaw, 46 SMU
L. REV. 329 (1992).
177 Dennis E. Cichon, Developing a Mental Health Code for Minors, 13 T.M. COOLEYL.
REV. 529, 533 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
' 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that the "general acceptance" standard for expert
testimony was superseded by FED. R. EVlD. 402). See generally Jane Goodman-Delahunty,
Forensic Psychological Expertise in the Wake of Daubert, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 121
(1997).
179 See Daniel W. Shuman, What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say
About "The Best Interests of the Child"?: An Essay on Common Sense, Daubert, and the
Rules of Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551 (1997).
so These pre-existing therapist-patient relationships may open the door to circumstances
in which the patient's right to privacy has been limited, such as where the therapist is
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
mental health professionals are ordered by courts of law to provide evaluations' 8 ,
and/or treatment to child patients; thus they have no pre-existing relationship with
the patient. Some of the mental health professionals are privately retained by the
child's family (not necessarily the parents), guardians or foster family, while others
are drawn to the case by virtue of providing services at public institutions such as
adolescent mental health hospitals or mental health clinics. Thus, the mental health
professionals are brought to the legal arena through a number of different entry
points, and they may or may not have pre-existing professional relationships with
the minors whom they evaluate and treat. The role of the mental health expert -
doing investigative interviews, conducting evaluations, providing appropriate
treatment plans, or providing actual therapy - should substantially alter the type
of record and the information the expert compiles.' 8 2
In situations where the mental health professional has treated or evaluated the
child patient prior to the state's involvement in a dependency action, the
professional has probably disclosed the duties and obligations, as well as the
limitations of those duties and obligations with the patient and the patient's parent
or guardian. However, this prior relationship in and of itself provides no guarantee
that the patient has been advised of the details and the limitations of confidentiality
and the privacy of the patient's records. These duties of disclosure owed to patients
are often found in the various professional codes of ethics." 3
obligated to disclose some medical records to the patient's employer or to the patient's
insurance company. See David G. Scalise & Kevin P. Farmer, Disclosure of a Patient's
Medical Information to Third Parties: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
199 (1998).
181 See generally JONATHAN W. GOULD, CONDUCTING SCIENTIFICALLY CRAFED CHILD
CUSTODY EvAwATIONS (1998).
182 In reviewing the theory and assessment techniques used to validate allegations of child
sexual abuse for forensic purposes, Fisher and Whiting observe:
In recent years, psychologists have been called on to assist the courts in drawing
conclusions about the probability that an alleged child victim has been sexually
abused. This has necessitated a shift in focus from clinical interviews primarily
designed to provide a foundation for appropriate treatment plans, to
investigatory interviews designed to substantiate whether a child has been
abused. In contrast to interviews conducted to determine appropriate therapeutic
procedures for identified victims of abuse, data collected for judicial evidentiary
purposes must rigorously avoid interview bias (e.g., a priori assumptions that the
abuse occurred) and contamination of the child's recollections. This is often
difficult because in many situations a complaint has already been filed and the
child has been questioned by one or several other investigators prior to seeing
the psychologist.
Celia B. Fisher & Katherine A. Whiting, How Valid are Child SexualAbuse Validations?,
in EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES: WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE SAID IN COURT
159, 161 (Stephen J. Ceci & Helene Hembrooke eds., 1998) (internal citations omitted).
'83 See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n Principles of Medical Ethics, Op. E-5.05 (1994).
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Voluntary membership professional organizations, such as the American
Psychological Association, have adopted professional ethics codes with specific
sections on forensic activities," 4 such as Standard 5.03, Minimizing Intrusions on
Privacy, which requires psychologists to provide "only information germane to the
purpose for which the communication is made" in oral and written reports.' The
American Psychological Association added a section on forensic activities to its
1992 revision of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct,
including Section 7.05 on prior relationships:
A prior professional relationship with a party does not preclude
psychologists from testifying as fact witnesses or from testifying to their
services to the extent permitted by applicable law. Psychologists
appropriately take into account ways in which the prior relationship
might affect their professional objectivity or opinions and disclose the
potential conflict to the relevant parties.'86
Similarly, the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law has its own ethical
guidelines which require psychiatrists to protect confidentiality and to notify clients
about the limitations of confidentiality, as well as to obtain clients' informed
consent whenever possible.8 7 One group of experts has suggested that the
"minimum standards for notice about the limits of confidentiality in a forensic
context"'88 should include the following:
(1) The name or role of the person(s) or agencies for whom the
clinician is conducting the evaluation and to whom the clinician
will submit a report.
(2) The legal issues that will be addressed in the evaluation...
's' See Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, Specialty Guidelines
for Forensic Psychologists, 15 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 655 (1991).
The Specialty Guidelinesfor Forensic Psychologists represent ajoint statement
of the American Psychology-Law Society and Division 41 of the American
Psychological Association and are endorsed by the American Academy of
Forensic Psychology.... The Guidelines provide an aspirational model of
desirable professional practice by psychologists... in an activity primarily
intended to provide professional psychological expertise to the judicial system.
Id. at 655-56.
18s See RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL SHUMAN, CONDUCTING INSANITY EVALUATIONS 41
(2d ed. 2000). Rogers and Shuman argue that in order to minimize privacy intrusions in
insanity evaluations, "potentially prejudicial information regarding family history of
criminality, substance abuse, or mental disorders are irrelevant to the issue of insanity and
should not be included in court reports." Id. (footnote omitted).
186 See American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles ofPsychologists and Code
of Conduct, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1597-1611 (Dec. 1992b).
187 ROGERS & SHuMAN, supra note 185, at 43 (citing AAPL Ethical Standards II, on
confidentiality, and IH, on informed consent).
188 MELTON ET AL, supra note 98, at 88.
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(3) The kinds of information most likely to be material to the
evaluation and the proposed techniques (interview, testing, etc.)
To be used to gather that information.
(4) The legal proceeding(s) (e.g., hearing; trial; posttrial sentencing
hearing) at which testimony is anticipated.
(5) The kinds of information that may require special disclosure to
third parties (e.g., an admission that one has abused a child) and
the potential consequences for the individual.
(6) Whether there is a legal right to decline/limit participation in the
evaluation and any known sanctions for declining. 89
Even if the patient has been advised about the limitations of confidentiality, that
confidentiality may be breached when the mental health professional is requested
or compelled to disclose information'" obtained during the prior or current
treatment. 191 In those situations where the mental health professional has no prior
relationship with the patient, however, it is important for the therapist/evaluator to
disclose to the patient and/or to the patient's parent or guardian the limitations of
confidentiality and privacy rights which the patient may enjoy. Obtaining the
patient's voluntary and informed written consent"r to disclose mental health records
in certain specified situations - such as when the mental health professional is
ordered to produce such information pursuant to a court order - provides clarity
for the patient, and provides a measure of protection for the mental health
9 Id.
90 See JAMES A. MONTELEONE, RECOGNMON OF CHILD ABUSE FOR THE MANDATED
REPORTER (3d ed. 2002).
'9 Jean Koh Peters discusses many of the conflicts these professionals face, especially
when requested to offer their opinion on what is in the client's best interests:
First, if a professional is currently treating the client, writing a report to a court
or attorney about the client's best interest could easily run afoul of the
confidentiality which the professional promised to the client. Second, even if the
confidentiality problems are resolved, through waiver, for instance, the
professional may still conclude that stating an opinion and laying forth the
evidence for that opinion at this juncture in the professional-child client
relationship would compromise the relationship .... Similarly, testifying in court
on a delicate matter like a child's removal from the home may forever taint the
professional's relationship with the family.... [Additionally], because these
professionals are already enmeshed in the client's life, they may not always have
unbiased information to offer.
Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for
Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1531 (1996).
'92 For a general discussion of the informed consent doctrine, see Alan Meisel et al.,
Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 285
(1977).
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professional.' The patient then has the right to determine what - if any -
information he or she is comfortable in disclosing.'94 The mental health
professional, on the other hand, has disclosed the circumstances and situations in
which confidentiality may be breached. Although the informed consent doctrine for
adult patients may be justified to protect an adult's right of self-determination and
to protect against authoritarian medical treatment, these justifications are difficult
to apply to child patients:
Because it was thought that children lacked the capacity to provide
consent for purposes of avoiding a battery, courts at common law held
that until children reached majority, only a parent or legal guardian
could give effective consent to medical treatment. What policies does
this rule serve? It protects the child from the responsibility of deciding
for himself. For infants and children who lack the maturity to evaluate
alternatives and to make an informed choice, someone must decide on
the child's behalf. But why parents? The general rule of paternal
consent is in accordance with broad notions of family privacy, parental
autonomy, and the importance of familial bonds. But at the root of the
common law rule was the narrower notion that parents are legally
responsible for the care and support of their children. Among other
things, the parental consent requirement protects parents from having to
pay for unwanted or unnecessary medical care and from the possible
financial consequences of supporting the child if unwanted treatment is
unsuccessful.'
'9' The American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children's Guidelines for
Evaluating Psychological Maltreatment recommend that:
Professionals conducting forensic assessments should be aware of legal and
ethical principles governing informed consent. Informed consent should be
obtained unless such consent is unnecessary because of the forensic nature of the
assessment. Whether or not informed consent is obtained, the professional
should advise persons being assessed of the purposes of the assessment and the
intended uses of any report or testimony resulting form the assessment.
In forensic situations where informed consent is required but the person being
assessed is incapable of giving such consent, the professional should consult
with the legal counsel or the judge regarding the appropriate way to proceed.
Myers, supra note 15, at § 4.40.
14 This may be a more commonplace problem in criminal/delinquency cases where the
patient's admissions might jeopardize constitutional protections, especially if the patient has
not been advised of his rights in advance of the forensic evaluation. See Kenneth E. Meister,
Miranda on the Couch: An Approach to Problems of Self-Incrimination, Right to Counsel
and Miranda Warnings in Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examinations of Criminal Defendants, 11
COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 403 (1975); Christopher Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith. The
Constitutional Contours of the Forensic Evaluation, 31 EMORY L.J. 71 (1982).
19' ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE: PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 601-02 (4th ed. 2000) (footnotes omitted).
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Nevertheless, unlike situations where the mental health professional is providing
therapy, the informed consent doctrine may not apply to forensic evaluations
because "the evaluation is court-ordered and will proceed whether the subject wants
it or not; in fact, in criminal cases the defendant may risk sanctions upon a
refusal to cooperate."'"
Although the process of obtaining informed patient consent' to disclose mental
health records may create some problems when the mental health professional is in
the embryonic stages of the therapeutic relationship with the patient,' it may also
be seen as empowering the patient and defining the terms of confidentiality and
privacy rights. In addition, seeking informed consent, even from young patients
helps the professional to ward off future malpractice actions.' 99 Because mental
health professionals are mandatory reporters of child abuse, patient disclosure
documents should include the legal or statutory requirements of the jurisdiction in
which the patient receives treatment. In addition to the jurisdiction's child abuse
disclosure requirements, the mental health professional's ethical disclosure duties
should also be incorporated in the patient disclosure document. Mandatory child
abuse disclosure laws are not uniform, and the precise language of these statutes
alters the legal duties of the affected professionals and their patients.
Actions for breach of confidentiality against therapists have been based upon
contract law and tort law.2°° Although, at least one author has argued that there has
been an increase in the number of reported cases against psychotherapists for breach
of patient confidentiality, a number of reasons contributes to the relatively small
number of cases actually reported: "the standard of care for psychotherapists is not
as clearly defined as in other fields of medicine";2"' "negligence in this area tends
usually only to exacerbate pre-existing emotional disorders";02 "patients are
reluctant to expose their mental health problems to the world";21 3 patients and their
196 MELTON E7 AL, supra note 98, at 79.
191 See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT (1986).
19' One study found that roughly half (only 54.9%) of the mental health professionals
surveyed in New York informed their clients about the limits of confidentiality and of their
status as mandated reporters early in therapy, before the client revealed anything that aroused
suspicion of child abuse or maltreatment. See Barbara Weinstein et al., Mental Health
Professionals' Experiences Reporting Suspected ChildAbuse and Maltreatment, 24 CHILD
ABUSE &NEGLECT 1317, 1321 (2000).
199 See Andrew Popper, Averting Malpractice by Information: Informed Consent in the
Pediatric Treatment Environment, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 819 (1998).
' See Ellen W. Grabois, The Liability ofPsychotherapistsforBreach of Confidentiality,
12 J.L. & HEALTH 39 (1998).
201 Id. at 43.
202 Id. at 44.
203 Id.
[Vol. 12:511
2004] CONFIDENTIALITY AND JUVENILE MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS 553
psychotherapists usually enjoy healthy rapport;2" and many patients simply fail to
recognize the role the therapist might have played in the patient's situation."'
The very nature of the mental health services being provided to minors requires
that some initial inquiry be made as to the capacity or competence of the child 6 to
provide informed consent,0 7 either to the treatment itself"°8 or to the disclosure of
mental health records. In the context of representing children in class action
litigation, one commentator summed up the problem of children's incapacity by
acknowledging that:
Young children often cannot state their own needs and desires. Older
children may be able to articulate their desires, but their desires may not
be accepted as authoritative in dictating the actions of their counsel.
Moreover, most structural reform cases on behalf of children involve
poor and minority children, where parents and communities may also be
unable to serve as a check on attorney power. At the same time, children
usually cannot participate directly in the political process by voting,
lobbying, organizing, or influencing the administrators of public
agencies.2 °9
Although legal capacity and competency are two different issues, they have
much in common. In the case of pre-adolescent children, the parent, caretaker or
guardian will have the legal capacity to consent to treatment and/or disclosure of
mental health records. 2 ° However, empowering parents to make decisions about
their children's mental health needs may be in part based upon a flawed
assumption.2" ' As one commentator has noted:
204 Id.
205 Id.
2"6 See Paul S. Applebaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent
to Treatment, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1635 (1988); Lois A. Weithorn, Children's Capacities
for Participation in Treatment Decision Making, in EMERGING ISSUES IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAw 28 (Diane H. Schetky & Elissa P. Benedek eds., 1985).
207 See generally Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Mentally Ill and Non-Mentally
ll Patients 'Abilities to Understand Informed Consent Disclosures forMedication, 15 LAW
& HUM. BEHAv. 377 (1991) (discussing informed consent and its relation to mental health).
218 See Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Informed Consent for
MentalHealth Treatment, 50 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 695,744-48 (1993).
209 Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty ofRepresentation in
Children's Class-Action Cases, 64FORDHAM L. REV. 1435,1442 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
20 See Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should
Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV.
1 (2000); Popper, supra note 199, at 330-32.
211 See generally Dennis E. Cichon, Developing a Mental Health Code for Minors, 13
T.M. CooLEY L. REv. 529 (1996) (asserting that parents often institutionalize their children
in psychiatric hospitals for inappropriate or harmful reasons).
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The assumption that parents act in their child's best interest is intuitively
sensible and inherently appealing. It undoubtedly holds true in most
families under normal circumstances. However, the legal system has
extended this generally valid assumption to one area where it may not be
tenable: the mental health context. The mental health literature is filled
with anecdotal, case-study, and empirical data indicating that parents
often act contrary to the best interests oftheir child in the area of mental
health treatment.2"2
This assumption notwithstanding, parents are recognized as having the capacity to
determine the mental health treatment needs of their children, especially pre-
adolescent children. 23
If the child in question is a party to a dependency proceeding, however, the
parent's capacity to make mental health decisions may be suspended."1 4 The child's
legal guardian, guardian ad litem,25 or perhaps even the child's counsel may be
called upon to make decisions concerning mental health issues on behalf of the
child in state custody. If this responsibility falls on the shoulders of the child's
attorney, this creates ethical problems for the child's counsel to resolve." 6 During
the 1996 Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in the Representation of Children,
one of the ten major themes highlighted was recognition that the lawyer's
responsibilities with respect to the child whom he represents will vary depending
on whether the child has capacity to direct the representation.' 7 This issue is likely
to be a constant concern in the field of child representation, and it should be
determined on a client by client basis.
212 Redding, supra note 208, at 697-98.
213 See generally Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that laws permitting
parents to voluntarily commit their minor children to state mental hospitals do not violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
214 See Kelli Schmidt, Note, "Who Are You to Say What My Best Interest Is? " Minors'
Due Process Rights When Admitted by Parents for Inpatient Mental Health Treatment, 71
WASH. L. REV. 1187,1206-08 (1996).
2,5 See generally Rebecca H. Heartz, Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings: Clarifying the Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 FAM. L.Q. 327 (1993).
2,6 See Jesica Matthews Eames, Comment, Seen But Not Heard: Advocatingfor the Legal
Representation of a Child's Expressed Wish in Protection Proceedings and
Recommendations for New Standards in Georgia, 48 EMORY L.J. 1431 (1999).
217 See Bruce A. Green & Bernardine Dohm, Foreword: Children and the Ethical
Practice of Law 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281, 1295 (1996).
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There are some exceptions where minors may consent to medical treatment,218
regardless of their age and without parental consent." 9 These exceptions include
providing consent to the diagnosis or treatment of venereal disease, drug addiction,
alcoholism, pregnancy,22 or donating blood."' Additionally, parental consent for
medical treatment is generallynot required in cases of medical emergencies,"' and,
in some instances, in cases where parents are thought to have neglected the child's
medical needs, 23 and where the minor seeks an abortion." 4 Legally-emancipated
minors - a concept developed as a means to allow parents to escape or relinquish
control over their children 2 5 - and minors in jurisdictions which recognize the
"mature minor" rule or doctrine"2 6 
- where children, usually 14 years of age and
older, understand the nature of proposed treatment and its risks, and the physician
believes the child can provide a similar degree of informed consent as that of an
adult, and where treatment does not involve very serious risks - are also capable
of giving consent to medical procedures without parental participation.
In the case of adolescent patients, the issue of capacity to consent is perhaps
more complicated. Although "[t]raditional common law viewed minors as unable
to make sound decisions about medical treatment," ' the mature minor doctrine
219 See, e.g., Jan C. Costello, Making Kids Take Their Medicine. The Privacy and Due
Process Rights of De Facto Competent Minors, 31 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 907,908-09 (1998).
219 See Janine P. Felsman, Note, Eliminating Parental Consent and Notification for
Adolescent HIV Testing: A Legitimate Statutory Response to the AIDS Epidemic, 5 J.L. &
POL'Y 339 (1996) (discussing laws allowing minors to consent to HIV testing without
parental consent).
220 See Stephanie Bornstein, The Undue Burden: Parental Notification Requirements for
Publicly Funded Contraception, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 40 (2000) (discussing
contraception and parental notification); Marilyn G. Hakim, Privacy Rights of Minors Re:
Sexual Intercourse, 18 J. Juv. L. 316 (1997) (discussing privacy interests of minors who are
having consensual sexual intercourse); Pilar S. Ramos, The Condom Controversy in the
Public Schools: Respecting a Minor's Right of Privacy, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 149 (1996)
(discussing minors' access to condoms).
221 See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 195, at 657-65.
222 See JAMES M. MORRISSEY ET AL, CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH
CARE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: A LEGAL GUIDE 50-54 (1986).
223 See J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Minors as Medical Decision Makers: The Pretextual
Reasoning of the Court in the Abortion Cases, 7 MICH. J. GENDER& L. 65, 74-75 (2000).
" See Michael Grimm, Comment, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungrew"
California's Parental Consent to Abortion Statute and the Right to Privacy, 25 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 463 (1995).
m2 See Sanford N. Katz et al., Emancipating Our Children - Coming of Legal Age in
America, 7 FAM. L.Q. 211 (1973); Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes:
Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 239, 240-41 (1992).
226 See Angela R. Holder, Disclosure and Consent Problems in Pediatrics, 16 LAW MED.
& HEALTH CARE 219, 221 (1988).
227 See Lisa Anne Hawkins, Note, Living Will Statutes: A Minor Oversight, 78 VA. L. REV.
1581, 1586 (1992).
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evolved and recognized that "if a minor is of sufficient intelligence and maturity to
understand and appreciate both the benefits and risks of the proposed medical or
surgical treatment, then the minor may consent to that treatment without parental
consent... ."' The three components of the legal definition of informed consent
require that decisions be made knowingly, competently, and voluntarily.229
Psychologists argue that:
Historically, because adolescents have been deemed "incompetent" by
virtue of their age, they have been seen as developmentally incapable of
providing informed consent; their decisions by definition fail the second
test of the informed consent doctrine. There are, however, at least three
problems in the application of the informed consent doctrine to
adolescent decision-making in legal situations. First, very little empirical
knowledge exists regarding age differences in the capacity to consent
either competently or voluntarily, and the few extant investigations of
the issue are inconclusive. Second, the courts have never adequately
defined competence; for example, the Second Restatement of Torts
describes competence to consent simply as an appreciation of the
"nature, extent, and probable consequences of the conduct consented to."
Finally, legal definitions of maturity vary both between legal
jurisdictions and between adjudicating individuals within the same
jurisdiction.23
Application of the informed consent doctrine to adolescent patients, even in
consideration of the mature minor doctrine, remains problematic.231 Nevertheless,
establishing a routine where adolescent patients are advised about the limits of
confidentiality and where their written consent to disclose pertinent information
because of the pending court action serves several purposes.2 32  First, it
acknowledges the patient's autonomy and control - albeit limited - over their
m See MORRISsEY ET AL, supra note 222, at 43.
229 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 197.
230 Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive andAffective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1766 (1995).
23 See Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test ofAutonomy: Should Minors Have a Right
to Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1996)
(discussing the problematic nature of a minor's right to consent to and refuse medical
treatment).
232 But see William Adams, "But Do You Have to Tell My Parents? " The Dilemma for
Minors Seeking HIV-Testing and Treatment, 27 J. MARSHALL L REV. 493, 506 (1994)
(arguing that disclosure might deter a minor from seeking medical treatment).
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personal mental health records."' This empowering gesture may be especially
beneficial to these particular patients - juveniles who have been adjudicated
dependent and who have lost control over the most fundamental aspects of their
daily lives. Second, it informs the patient, prior to the court proceeding, about the
necessity of release or disclosure of some of the communications made during
evaluations or therapy. This helps to eliminate the shock of disclosure some
patients may be exposed to during the course of litigation. Third, it provides
direction and scope for the therapist who maybe uncertain about which information
should remain protected by privilege or confidentiality. Fourth, it should help to
prevent some of the ambiguities which give rise to malpractice or breach of contract
actions based upon privacy issues.3
4
VII. PROTECTING THE JUVENILE'S MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS
A number of preemptive legal mechanisms currently assist in protecting the
confidentiality of juvenile mental health records. Evidentiary rules, restraining
orders, and discovery statutes might all play useful roles in limiting the disclosure
of some juvenile mental health records in dependency proceedings. Although there
may be instances in which juveniles might consider suits for breach of privacy for
the disclosure of their mental health records, this approach has many limitations and
offers little promise of relief. '35 First, the juvenile would have to overcome
statutory immunity provisions which shield the various officials engaged in
providing court-ordered services to children in state custody.236 The various lower
23' See generally Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and PsychologicalPerspectives,
37 VILL L. REV. 1705 (1992).
2 See generally Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1335
(1992) (discussing the ambiguous nature of the right to privacy that results from the many
sources of the right).
235 See Eric P. Gifford, Comment, 42 U.S. § 1983 and Social Worker Immunity: A
Cause of Action Denied, 26 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1013 (1995) (reviewing social worker's
immunity claims when they fail to act on evidence of child abuse or neglect).
236 The Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992):
foreclosed private lawsuits brought by abused and neglected children who were
attempting to force states to make reasonable efforts to provide adequate child
protection services. As beneficiaries of federal child protection legislation,
children brought suit pursuant to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980. .. and42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State's Burden Under
Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PuB. INT. L. 1. 259,259 (2002). The Court in
Suter held that child plaintiffs did not have a federally enforceable right to reasonable efforts.
Id.
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court decisions 37 following the Supreme Court's 1989 ruling in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,23 offer little hope that actions
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause239 will guarantee minimal
levels of safety and security for children, especially if children are not harmed
directly by the State,24 but by third parties. 4 Because of the limitations of after-
the-fact legal remedies (such as suits for damages for breach of privacy),242 it
appears that the more propitious approach to protecting juvenile mental health
records would be to preemptively limit their disclosure in court proceedings.
Thosejurisdictions which continue to follow the CAPTA-grant-driven statutory
enactments,243 which close dependency proceedings to the public and the press,
offer one form of protection from disclosure of a child's mental health records.2"
However, even in so-called closed hearings, many individuals may be present who
have no connection with the juvenile's case. Lawyers awaiting other cases, court
staff and professionals waiting to testify in unrelated cases may be present in court
23 See Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional
Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REv. 107 (1991).
238 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
.3 Butsee Laura Oren, DeShaney's UnfinishedBusiness: The Foster Child's Due Process
Right to Safety, 69 N.C. L. REv. 113 (1990).
240 See Catherine A. Crosby-Currie & N. Dickon Reppucci, The Missing Child in Child
Protection: The Constitutional Context of Child Maltreatmentfrom Meyer to DeShaney, 21
LAw & POL'Y 129 (1999); Mary Kate Kearney, Breaking the Silence: Tort Liability for
Failing to Protect Children from Abuse, 42 BuFF. L. REv. 405 (1994).
"4 See Mary Kate Kearney, DeShaney's Legacy in Foster Care and Public School
Settings, 41 WAsHBuRN L.J. 275,276 (2002) (asserting that "although the State was not liable
for harm inflicted on a child by a father because the State's affirmative duty of protection did
not reach into the father's home," the issue remains "under what circumstances the State does
owe a child an affirmative duty of protection").
.42 These limitations are numerous. Other than those states which have enacted specific
provisions in their state constitutions creating rights of privacy, the entire concept of a minor
having an enforceable right of privacy is generally limited to violations of those statutory
enactments such as educational privacy laws and technology-based privacy laws such as the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2002) (FERPA),
or the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-03 (2002).
Locating attorneys willing to initiate suits on behalf of children for privacy breaches would
be more than a little challenging as well. Other than in cases where the child is able to
document a significant impact from the courtroom disclosure, such suits might generate
relatively low damage awards. Thus, the local bar might be less than enthusiastic about filing
such actions.
243 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1972, as amended in 1996,42 U.S.C.
§ 5101.
244 See Susan S. Greenebaum, ConditionalAccess to Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Prior
Restraint or a Viable Solution?, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135, 140-43 (1993).
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while a child's mental health records become the focus of a dependency
proceeding. 245
Evidentiary objections offer yet another legal mechanism to restrict the
disclosure ofajuvenile's mental health records in a dependency proceeding.24 The
child's counsel may object to the relevance of admitting the child's entire mental
health record into evidence, depending upon the nature of the hearing and the
reason why the mental health record is being offered.24 7 This is not to suggest that
mental health records are not relevant to dependency proceedings, for they may well
be relevant. However, it may not be necessary to divulge ajuvenile's entire mental
health record in order for the court to reach whatever conclusion the hearing is
designed to facilitate. For instance, if the hearing is a status hearing to determine
whether the state has complied with a court order to provide a child in state custody
with therapy, then the actual compliance with the court order may be relevant,
whereas the findings of the child's therapist might not be relevant. "There are two
components to relevant evidence: materiality and probative value., 248 Evidence
would be immaterial if it were offered to help prove a proposition that is not a
matter in issue.249 The precise disclosures a juvenile makes to a therapist may have
no bearing on whether the state complied with the court's order by arranging the
therapy session, and evidentiary objections may serve the purpose of helping to
maintain the child's confidential disclosures.2 Additionally, the jurisdiction may
recognize a "psychotherapist/patient" privilege as part of the state evidence code, 25'
and counsel might raise objections to disclosure of the minor's mental health
records on this basis.
Several measures can help to ensure that a minor's mental health records are not
unnecessarily publicized or disclosed. A crucial issue concerns the concept of
'4s See Emily Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the
Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. &POL'YREV. 155 (1999) (discussing the
debate over whether juvenile and family court proceedings should be open to the public).
246 See generally Craig Lee Montz, Trial Objections from Beginning to End.- The
Handbookfor Civil and Criminal Trials, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 243 (2002) (discussing the range
of evidentiary objections available to a trial lawyer).
"' Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID.
401.
24 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999).
249 Id.
2o See Montz, supra note 246, at 246 (stating that "[objections] attempt[] to prevent the
admission of inadmissible evidenoe").
2" See People v. Tauer, 847 P.2d 259, 260-61 (Colo. App. 1993) (protecting teenage
victim's mental health records under Colorado privilege); Attorney ad Litem for D.K. v.
Parents ofD.K., 780 So. 2d 301,304-08 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 2001) (describing and applying
the statutory privilege to minors).
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"'unnecessary" disclosure. The fact that a child is involved in juvenile court
dependency proceedings suggests that the child has been abused or neglected, and
that a thorough evaluation of the child's condition is essential for an adjudication
hearing. It would be self-defeating to restrict the free flow of mental health
testimony and mental health records under the guise of protecting the child's right
to privacy, or honoring the child's privileged communications with mental health
professionals. Given the very high rates of child abuse victimization by adult
inpatients at psychiatric hospitals,252 a prohibition against the use of children's
mental health records in juvenile proceedings might well exacerbate a major social
problem and aid in its continuation into the next generation. 253 The objective is not
to ban the use of mental health records in dependency proceedings, but to restrict
the disclosures made so as to allow the court to accomplish the goal of providing
juveniles with the services of mental health professionals while avoiding destroying
or undermining the confidentiality of the therapist-patient relationship.
The concern that professionals should embrace is the degree to which otherwise
private or confidential mental health information needs to be disclosed in court
proceedings. It may be unnecessary, for example, to disclose a child's actual
comments about her parents in a court proceeding where the comments may not be
relevant to the issue before the court.2" It may not be necessary to disclose a
child's newly discovered sexual orientation,2"' unless that is an issue that merits the
252 See John Read, Child Abuse and Severity of Disturbance Among Adult Psychiatric
Inpatients, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 359 (1998).
In the last decade it has been repeatedly demonstrated that psychiatric inpatients
frequently have histories of abuse as children. A recent review of 15 studies
from 1984 to 1996 (Read, 1997a) has calculated that 64% of women inpatients
report either physical or sexual childhood abuse .... Male inpatients report
similar rates of childhood physical abuse but lower rates of childhood sexual
abuse than female inpatients (Jacobson & Richardson, 1987).
Id. at 359.
" For a discussion of the intergenerational cycle of violence and child abuse, see James
J. Williams, The Cycle of Abuse, in CHILD MALTREATMENT, A CLNICAL GUIDE AND
REFERENCE 397 (J.A. Monteleone ed., 2d ed. 1998). It should be noted, however, that
intergenerational transmission is not nearly as prevalent in cases involving neglect. See
Gaudin, supra note 46, at 103-04 (the evidence suggests that intergenerational repetition
applies only to a minority of chronically neglectful families, with one study reporting only
15% ofneglectfitl mothers having a clear history of neglect in their own childhoods); see also
Katherine C. Pears & Deborah M. Capaldi, Intergenerational Transmission of Abuse: A
Two-Generational Prospective Study of an At-Risk Sample, 25 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
1439 (2001) (discussing the results ofa data model showing that the children of abuse victims
may, in turn, become abusers themselves).
254 See FED. R. EviD. 401.
25 See Ingrid Schupbach Martin, The Right to Stay in the Closet: Informational
Disclosures by Government Offcials, 32 SErON HALL L. REv. 407 (2002) (examining the
"tensions" between privacy and government interests in obtaining personal information and
concluding that more rights protection is needed).
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court's attention because it requires services which may not be included in the
child's caseplan. The intimate details of therapy sessions may generate great
interest in an otherwise mundane court hearing, but such disclosures may contribute
very little towards reunifying families, or moving towards long term foster care, or
termination of parental rights and subsequent adoption. Similarly, after an
adjudication is granted, it may not be necessary to divulge what occurs in the course
of the child's therapy, or in the course of family therapy. This type of information
may be routinely incorporated in mental health reports to the juvenile court simply
because the reporter has not been told or ordered to do otherwise.
Although discerning between "necessary" and "unnecessary" disclosures
ultimately requires a judgment call on the part of the mental health provider,2" such
a determination might be better made where the court identifies specific issues
germane to the court's review process prior to the creation of mental health reports,
or before mental health professionals' testimony is offered into the record. A
number of procedures might help preserve the child's sense of privacy and
confidentiality, despite the court's involvement in the child's daily life pending
termination of parental rights, long term foster care placement, or reunification with
the family.257
First, the child's attorney 5 might routinely provide written notification and
copies of pertinent statutes, case decisions, and rules of court to all mental health
professionals involved in the case.59 This step should be taken well in advance of
the preparation of any written evaluations or reports in connection with the matter
in dispute. Such written notice should include any statutory provisions governing
informed patient consent, and any cases, statutes, or laws establishing a mature
minor doctrine, and any material pertinent to the limitations of discovery. If the
... A similar issue arises when a mental health care provider decides what is "medically
necessary" for Medicaid mental health care. See John A. Flippen, Note, The Early and
Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment Program and Managed Medicaid Mental
Health Care: The Need to Reevaluate the EPSDT in the Managed Care Era, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 683, 698-99 (1997) (stating that "a physician... determines which treatments are
medically necessary for a particular diagnosis [in determining eligibility]").
"' See generally Gary B. Melton, Minors and Privacy: Are Legal and Psychological
Concepts Compatible?, 62 NEB. L. REv. 455,456 (1983) (arguing that "an examination of
the significance of privacy for minors.. . would result in a more ... humane policy of
respect for children's personhood").
... The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges' 1998 survey found that
only 40 states require the appointment of lawyers for children in abuse and neglect cases. See
SHIRLEY A. DOBBIN E7 AL., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES: REPRESENTATION AS A
CRrTCAL COMPONENT OF EFFEcrrvE PRACTICE 43-44 (1998).
"9 Although a qualified forensic expert would be expected to be familiar with the laws and
regulations applicable to her field, most mental health professionals are not forensic experts.
For a discussion of how to thoroughly prepare an expert in this field of litigation, see PAUL
STERN, PREPARING AND PRESENTING EXPERT TESTIMONY IN CHILD ABUSE LmIGATION: A
GUIDE FOR EXPERT WnTNESSES AND ATrORNEYS (1997).
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same group of professionals regularly engage in evaluation and treatment in
juvenile proceedings, the necessity of sending out repeated written notices
diminishes. By providing such information to the evaluator or therapist, the mental
health expert is better prepared to defend whatever limitations she may deem to be
appropriate when testifying or providing written reports for the court. Although the
juvenile court system routinely enrolls the services of mental health experts, it does
not always defer to their expertise when determining what is therapeutically
recommended or what is in the best interest of their patients.2"
Second, if the evaluation or written reports pertains to the represented child,
counsel for the child might request that the evaluator not initially distribute any
written reports to all counsel of record or all parties involved. Counsel might file
a motion requesting the court to conduct an in camera inspection of the evaluation
or report,26' or to at least allow counsel an opportunity to have a hearing to consider
limiting the scope of the information which is disclosed in open court.262 Similarly,
if the mental health professional believes that some of the contents of the written
report should not be disclosed, the child's counsel may wish to request the
court to redact that information, or to limit the scope of direct and cross
examination prior to the hearing.263
Disclosure ofpersonal information which is not germane to questions before the
court serve little purpose other than to potentially embarrass the child. If the child
has disclosed to a therapist that he hates his parents, yet such information is not
relevant to the issue before the court, then disclosing such a remark in the presence
of the child's parents may be counterproductive, regardless of the goals of the
system. Once the child has reached the age of majority, many courts relinquish
260 See, e.g., Daniel B. Lord, Note, Determining Reliability Factors in Child Hearsay
Statements: Wright and its Progeny Confront the Psychological Research, 79 IOWAL. REV.
1149, 1177-78 (1994) (arguing that courts "rely[] principally on precedent" rather than
research when determining the reliability of child witnesses).
261 This in camera review process was adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in Nelson v. Ferguson, 399 S.E. 2d 909 (1990):
[If] the mental health records [of a minor] are sought for the purpose of seeking
to impeach the witness' credibility, the circuit court should first examine the
records ex parte to determine if the request is frivolous. If the court finds
probable cause to believe that the mental health records contain material relevant
to the credibility issue, counsel should be allowed to examine the records, after
which an in camera hearing should be held [to allow both sides to present
arguments on relevance about designated parts of the record].
Id. at 910.
262 See generally 2 RANDY HERTz Er AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATrORNEYS IN
JUVENILE COURT, § 46.02 (1991) (advising motion in limine).
263 Yet another approach might be for the court to order production of the child's mental
health records following an in camera hearing, but to also issue a "protective order
prohibiting the disclosure of the contents of the [mental health] records." In re Saint, 785
N.E.2d 1101, 1101 (Ind. 2003).
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personal or subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Although the court system
may no longer be a presence in the former child's life, the parents - even abusive
parents - may continue to play a major role in the former child's life. Many
children continue their contact with biological families, even after legal proceedings
have terminated parental rights." Selective disclosure of a child's statements
during evaluation or therapy does not simply promote the child's sense of privacy
and confidentiality, it also helps to provide an opportunity for the child to expose
his thoughts without having to confront the adult subjects of those thoughts.265
Open and public disclosure of every statement a child makes during evaluation or
24 Experts recognize that:
Although there is a growing body of research on the characteristics of incestuous
families, no longitudinal study has examined how these families change,
function, and naturally resolve these family relationship tasks over time. In
addition, no longitudinal study has investigated the long-term familial and
relational effects of interventions commonly used in sexual abuse cases.
Consequently, at this point little guidance is available from the empirical
research literature. However, it is clear that these families do not cease to exist
when a child abuse case is closed by professionals or a parent offender is
sentenced to prison. It is likely that in most cases ofparent-child sexual abuse,
families will persist in one form or another long after the professionals have
exited their lives. Even if the offender is incarcerated, he likely will be released
within five years, and most probably will return to the family.
Benjamin E. Saunders & Mary Meinig, Immediate Issues Affecting Long-term Family
Resolution in Cases of Parent-Child Sexual Abuse, in TREATMENT OF CHILD ABuSE:
COMMON GROUND FOR MENTAL HEALTH, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL PRAcTmoNERs 36, 38
(Robert M. Reece ed., 2000) (emphasis added).
" If a child is safely residing in a foster home, and the parents are involved in therapy
attempting to improve their parenting skills, divulging the child's every disclosure to the
child's therapist may be counter-productive for the parents, as well. Understanding the
opposition of many child-abusing parents, themselves victims of abusive childhoods, may
assist in prioritizing the confidentiality of child victims, especially in the early stages of the
family members' therapy:
Among all the kinds of perpetrators of child abuse and across the wide spectrum
of maltreatment, it is necessary to know how the perpetrator's child-caring
abilities have been directed or hampered by his or her own past experiences. The
behavior and caregiving patterns of perpetrators are impossible to "treat" or
deeply influence unless we attempt to understand these perpetrators in relation
to their own history. Not all perpetrators are cooperative and submissive at the
beginning of a therapeutic relationship. Many are angry, rebellious,
uncooperative, denying all problems and any need for help, and wish only that
all the authorities would get out of their lives and leave them alone to raise their
children in the way they please.
Brandt T. Steele, Further Reflections on the Therapy of Those Who Maltreat Children, in
THE BATrERED CHILD 566, 567, 571 (Mary Edna Helfer, Ruth S. Kempe, & Richard
Krugman eds., 5th ed. 1997).
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therapy may further complicate the process of resolving the problems that caused
the child to be involved in the juvenile court process in the first place.2"
Third, requesting the court to provide specific requests and guidance to mental
health professionals might also eliminate or at least restrict the disclosure of patient
confidences that are not germane to issues pending before the court. It is not an
uncommon practice for juvenile courts to order mental health evaluations on a child
without specifying what issues or concerns the court wishes the evaluator to
address. For instance, a child may have been traumatized&67 by exposure to sexual
abuse,26 and the petition filed in the court proceedings may assert such facts, and
thus the court may wish to have the child evaluated specifically for this in order to
2 Additionally, such disclosures might be misleading to the court. The state of the art
knowledge of child psychologists is not a constant factor, it changes as scientific research is
done and published. What may be assumed about patterns of behavior in abused children
today may well be refuted tomorrow:
Although it was claimed that there is a systematic pattern to the disclosure of
child abuse that involves initial denial, subsequent disclosure, recanting, and
finally repeated disclosure, research in support of this presumed sequence (see,
e.g., Gonzalez, Waterman, Kelly, McCord, & Oliveri, 1993; Sorensen & Snow,
1991) is problematic because of difficulties with the validation of the abuse (vs.
nonabuse) status of the children included in the studies. As far as we can tell,
without physical or other corroborative evidence, there is no way to know with
absolute certainty whether children who initially deny abuse were or were not
abused. The situation is complicated further by conflicting reports in the
literature (see, e.g., Bradley & Wood, 1996), leaving us in basic agreement with
Ceci and Bruck's (1995) assessment that there is no one pattern of disclosure
that accounts for the behavior of all (or even most) children suspected of having
been sexually abused.
Ornstein & Gordon, supra note 14, at 239.
26' Steele explains "trauma" in neglect and abuse scenarios as follows:
The deleterious effects of child maltreatment can be generically described as the
consequences of trauma. The concept of trauma is borrowed from medicine,
where it defines bodily damage such as fractures, lacerations, and bums caused
by the impact of some object or substance. In maltreatment, the term has been
broadened to include damage to the child's psychological, cognitive, emotional,
and social functions caused by the behaviors of caregivers and others.
Psychological trauma occurs when there is an imbalance - when a stronger,
noxious stimulus overwhelms a weaker coping abilityofthe child. Consequently,
the child's psychic functions are disturbed and disabled.
Brandt F. Steele, Psychodynamic and Biological Factors in Child Maltreatment, in THE
BATrERED CHMD, supra note 265, at 73, 79.
26 Traumatized sex abuse victims may also create problems by providing different factual
information or inconsistent versions ofwhat occurred. See United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d
740,742 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that "[s]ome degree of inconsistency is not surprising when
a minor testifies about traumatic events instigated by a close relative"), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1258 (1997).
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determine whether the child should be removed from an unsafe environment.
Including material in the mental health evaluation which does not address the
child's possible post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD")2 69 may be irrelevant for
purposes of this particular evaluation. Similarly, many issues may arise in the
course of the child's therapy which are unrelated to the issues pending before the
court. One commentator has noted that:
Experience has shown that one of the most common shortcomings of
psychological evaluations in child protection matters is that the
practitioner uncritically accepts a case from a referring party who
couches the reason for referral in general terms - for example, "We
want a psychological on this birth parent." In fact, this is a common
complaint from casework supervisors, whose supervisees have made this
type of amorphous assessment request. When the evaluator accepts the
case without clarifying what the agency needs from the testing, casework
supervisors, who must decide on appropriate intervention strategies, find
such "generic" or "vanilla" psychological reports to be of little value in
providing guidance. Before accepting the referral at all, it is important
for psychologists to ascertain what specific issues the examination is to
address.Y°
If the court narrows the scope of the evaluation or of the written report, then the
child's privacy is better protected. It may not be necessary, and, in fact, it may be
counterproductive to the child's treatment, for the therapist to include in the written
report to the court every aspect of the child's therapy.
Fourth, it may be sufficient to have the mental health evaluator/therapist
document that the evaluation/therapy is ongoing, rather than disclosing detailed
information in written or oral testimony."' For instance, if a child has weekly
269 See Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2027 (1994); Karl
Kirkland, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder vs. Pseudo Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 56
ALA. LAw 90 (1995).
"0 DYER, supra note 36, at 87.
2" Nondisclosure ofinformation, however, also raises a number ofproblems. For instance,
if the therapist is restricted in the number or frequency of treatment sessions by financial
limitations, then the court may have no means of ensuring that the child-patient is receiving
necessary services for the child's adjustment, especially if the only information provided by
the mental health care provider is limited in scope. The child's counsel might not be in a
position to independently assess the client's progress in therapy given the limited disclosures
by the therapist. Managed care providers must currently deal with the ethical dilemmas of
providing limited information to their patients about non-covered forms of treatment, and
whether non-disclosed treatment options satisfy the requirements of the informed consent
doctrine. See Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era ofHealth Care
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scheduled therapy sessions, ensuring the court that the sessions are occurring may
be sufficient to keep the court and all litigants aware of compliance with any court
orders. This might circumvent the need to disclose any specific information which
has been developed in the course of the therapy. In other words, the less detailed
information disclosed, the better. Of course, such cryptic reports to the court may
not be sufficient, but whenever possible, counsel and the mental health professional
should prevent disclosure, if preserving the confidentiality of the therapeutic
relationship is a legitimate objective. This approach might not be appropriate when
a court has ordered an initial psychiatric or psychological evaluation of a juvenile,
but even in those circumstances, it might not be necessary to disclose the contents
of the evaluation.
In the post-adjudication review stages of a case, however, it might be easier to
protect the child's disclosures made in ongoing therapy sessions. Of course, this is
not to suggest that mandatory reporters of abuse or neglect should disregard their
legal duties, 72 but they may report such disclosures to state authorities without
necessarily divulging the child's information in open court. If the therapist believes
the child is in need of special court-ordered services, then the therapist would
probably want to make the disclosure in court. However, if the child is already
receiving whatever services the community is able to provide, then the court
disclosure by the therapist might be counter-productive. The objective here is not
to withhold important developments from the court and the various parties, but to
maintain the benefits of the therapeutic intervention by attempting to preserve the
confidentiality of the patient's disclosures whenever possible.
Fifth, the court might consider allowing the mental health professional to
maintain more than one set of written records or to organize a child's records into
two separate sections: privileged information and non-privileged information.273
The type of documentation, currently required by many third parties responsible for
payment of the professional services, would be one possible model to follow. Many
insurance companies and managed health care providers only receive materials
containing numerical codes which designate the type of treatment the patient has
Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1999) (arguing that physicians have explicit and
implicit incentives to withhold treatments not covered by insurance plans).
272 See GLARDINO & GIARDINo, supra note 57.
273 Myers suggests maintaining privileged information separately from non-privileged
information, so that when a professional reviews a record before testifying:
it is sometimes possible to avoid review of privileged communications. This
done, if a judge orders the record disclosed, the judge may be willing to limit
disclosure to nonprivileged portions of the record. Although this approach
entails the burden of separating records into privileged and nonprivileged
sections, and may not persuade all judges, the technique is worth considering,
especially for professionals who testify regularly.
Myers, supra note 9 1, at 313.
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received.274 It is not necessary to provide the insurer or HMO with actual copies of
the therapist's notes or other documents from the patient's file.27 5 This process
documents the provision of services without jeopardizing the confidential
disclosures made by the patient.276
If the mental health professional includes her own written mental notes and
impressions as part of the patient's file, such information probably should not be
subject to open disclosure in a juvenile dependency proceeding. For instance, if a
patient has disclosed information and the therapist is skeptical about the veracity of
the disclosure, requiring the therapist to make such a revelation in court would
likely undermine the therapeutic relationship. This type of record keeping, if
permitted, would be subject to disclosure to all counsel of record.27 It is
274 The aggressive cost-saving policies of market-driven managed care organizations will
likely create many tensions for patient-physician confidentiality in the future:
The organization, management, and delivery of health care has become highly
information-sensitive, especially so in the case of managed care. Sharing of
patient medical and financial information among physicians, hospitals, payors,
employers, pharmacies and related health care entities through networked
computers and relational databases is a common and permanent feature of all
MCOs [managed care organizations].... The abuses of medical confidentiality
that could stem from easy access to sensitive medical information on unsecured
electronic information systems have been discussed at great length and depth in
the popular press, the professional literature, and in a recent report from a blue
ribbon panel convened by the National Academy of Sciences/National Research
Council (NRC).
Jeroo S. Kotval, Market-Driven Managed Care and the Confidentiality of Genetic Tests: The
Institution as Double Agent, 9 ALB. L.J. Sd. & TECH. 1, 11-12 (1998).
275 This is not to suggest that there are no problems with the manner in which insurers
provide coverage for clients in need of mental health care. For a discussion of the disparity
in insurance coverage for medical versus mental health illness, see Brian D. Shannon, Paving
the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or Merely
Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 63, 65-72 (1997).
276 See generally White, supra note 96.
277 It is helpful to note that disclosures of the mental health records might occur in
response to a discovery motion filed by a parent's attorney, or they might occur during
litigation should the mental health provider reveal during cross-examination that her
testimony is based upon a record or file with which the opposing party has not been provided.
If the information is being requested while the therapist testifies, then the child's counsel may
assert the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and opposing counsel will likely respond that the
privilege has been waived (either because the child's mental health has been placed in issue,
or because the disclosure was made pursuant to a court-ordered therapeutic intervention). See
Edward Imwinkelried, The Rivalry Between Truth and Privilege: The Weakness of the
Supreme Court's Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 US. 1 (1996), 49
HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1998) (arguing that the court should not have implemented a
psychotherapist privilege because autonomy and the ability to determine truth in the litigation
process outweigh any privacy interest); Pouli, supra note 102, at 1385-87; Glen
Weissenberger, The Psychotherapist Privilege andtheSupreme Court's MisplacedReliance
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foreseeable that an unfavorable or critical mental health report, from the perspective
of the party subject to the evaluation, could open the door to that party's attempt to
obtain all written records in order to prepare to cross examine, or perhaps challenge,
the mental health professional.27
Sixth, courts may adopt local rules which better coordinate the disclosure of
sensitive records from a child's mental health evaluations or therapy sessions.279
This would be especially helpful in situations where multiple courts are involved
in the child's life. Although the mental health records may be prepared in
conjunction with an ongoingjuvenile proceeding, they may be sought after by other
counsel involved in other legal proceedings. If the child's parents or caregivers are
subject to criminal prosecution for the behavior which gave rise to the dependency
action in juvenile court,2" the attorney for the accused parents may well seek to
discover the child's therapist's notes and reports,2"' only to use them to discredit the
child witness should she testify in the criminal case. 2 Many jurisdictions do very
little to coordinate concurrent criminal prosecutions for child abuse and neglect
with ongoing juvenile dependency cases."8 3 One consequence of this lack of
coordination may be the untimely delay of therapeutic interventions to provide
treatment to the family members. Additionally, because discovery rules vary
greatly in civil and criminal proceedings, 2 whenever counsel recognize an
on State Legislatures, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 999, 1005-06 (1998) (questioning how the
"competing autonomy interests" of the patient and litigant will be resolved in light of the
therapist patient privilege).
278 See generally JAY ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTIMONY (5th ed. 1995).
279 For an example of a case adopting a rule requiring a threshold showing by the moving
party seeking access to the child's mental health records that such disclosure may reasonably
be expected to provide information material to the moving party's defense, see State v. Ruiz,
34 P.3d 630, 639 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
20 See William Wesley Patton, Child Abuse: The Irreconcilable Differences Between
CriminalProsecution andInformalDependency Court Mediation, 31 U. LouIsvLLE J. FAM.
L. 37 (1992-93).
281 This might place the onus on the therapist to resist the third party's attempt to obtain
the patient's records. See Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of
the Physician in the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REV. 255 (1984) (contending
that legislation should guide physicians through ethical issues when confidential records are
requested by non-professionals).
22 And the right ofconfrontationprobably supercedes any privacy interest the child might
otherwise assert. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to confront a witness in a criminal trial was violated when the State refused
to allow defense counsel to cross-examine and impeach a key prosecution witness about his
confidential juvenile delinquency record).
2 3 See Marcia Sprague and Mark Hardin, Coordination of Juvenile and Criminal Court
Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 35 U. LOUISvILLE J. FAM. L. 239 (1996-97).
24 Unlike the discovery rules in many civil matters, criminal discovery provisions have
been broadened, in part, because of the Brady v. Maryland decision - and its progeny -
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opportunity to take advantage of the more liberal civil discovery rules, they will
most certainly do so in order to provide competent representation for their clients.
Whenever criminal cases and dependency cases are handled simultaneously,285
the potential inconsistencies in the systems frequently work to the disadvantage of
children.28 6 For example, if a parent voluntarily stipulates that his child should be
adjudicated dependent in the civil or juvenile forum, but demands to go to trial in
the criminal forum, the parent remains in a potentially adverse position in
relationship to the child." 7 The parent's admission in the civil proceeding might not
even be introduced in the pending criminal matter 8 in those jurisdictions where
such admissions are allowed only where the parent actually takes the witness stand,
testifies, and then is subjected to cross-examination.289 The child may become the
which held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment."
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)
(requiring prosecutorial disclosure of impeachment evidence in addition to exculpatory
evidence); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (establishing that when failure by the
prosecution to disclose material evidence is raised, the standard for materiality allows review
of the suppressed evidence collectively, not item by item).
285 See Sprague & Hardin, supra note 283.
286 St. Onge and Elam describe the differences in objectives of criminal and civil system
interventions for physically-abused children as follows:
The purpose of the child protective service agency's civil investigation is to
protect the child from further harm. The agency, however, has a further mandate
to prevent removal of the child from his or her home if appropriate safeguards
can be applied. The purpose of the initial investigation is to gather sufficient
information to determine if child maltreatment occurred, if there is a risk of
future maltreatment, and the level of that risk....
Criminal proceedings differ from civil proceedings in several important ways.
First, the goal of a criminal proceeding is primarily to identify the abuser, gather
sufficient evidence to successfully prosecute the abuser, and, after conviction,
to fashion a sentence that punishes the crime, reflects the particular vulnerability
of the child victim, reflects the particular circumstances of the abuser, and
provides for rehabilitation of the offender and safety for the child. Additionally,
the criminal process is designed to serve as a deterrent to others.
Anita M. St. Onge & Megan L. Elam, Legal Intervention for the Physically Abused Child,
in TREATMENT OF CrinD ABUSE, COMMON GROUND FOR MErTAL HEALTH, MEDICAL, AND
LEGAL PRACTrIONERS 107, 108 (Robert M. Reece ed., 2000).
2 See generally Bruce A. Boyer, Ethical Issues in the Representation ofParents in Child
Welfare Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1621 (1996); Ross, supra note 161, at 1583-87.
2a See William Wesley Patton, The World Where ParallelLines Converge: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24
GA. L. REv. 473,477-85 (1990).
289 See generally Brian D. Gallagher, "The Right of the People... " The Exclusionary
Rule in Child Abuse Litigation, 4 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 1, 7-10 (2000).
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principal witness against the parent in the criminal trial.2 '" Even if the child has
been removed from the offending parent's custody, the court handling the civil
dependency proceeding may still consider reuniting the child with the offending
parent. The prospect of referring such a family to therapy would have little or no
merit,2 9" ' especially if the therapeutic foundation is based on the parent admitting to
misconduct directed at the child.292 Additionally, counsel for accused sex offenders
may encourage their clients to be more resistant to admitting any misconduct if the
criminal trial is pending. Such admissions might be used against the parent should
the parent elect to waive their Fifth Amendment privilege and testify, and if the
admission was made to someone other than a law enforcement official, then the
statement might be admitted without any Fourth Amendment challenges.293 Lastly,
as more states enact sexual predator laws,' which increase sentences for first time
sex offenders and authorize civil commitment for sex offenders following the
completion of their prison terms," defense counsel for accused sex offenders must
2 Although four states - Idaho, Minnesota, Connecticut, and Massachusetts - have
created parent-child testimonial privileges by statute, and the courts of one state - New
York- have expressly recognized a qualifiedparent-child privilege, the privilege apparently
"is not applicable where the offense at issue was committed against the child or against
another family member." See Catherine J. Ross, Implementing Constitutional Rights for
Juveniles: The Parent-Child Privilege in Context, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 85, 97-99
(2003).
29' See Jonathan Kaden, Comment, Therapy for Convicted Sex Offenders: Pursuing
Rehabilitation Without Incrimination, 89 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 347, 349-50 (1998).
[O]ffenders who have refused to admit guilt in court may not be inclined to
admit guilt in therapy either; thus their participation in therapy may be
terminated, leaving them untreated and more dangerous than if they had been
meaningfully involved in therapies that did not require an admission of guilt.
Id. at 349.
292 See Brendan J. Shevlin, Note, "[B] etween the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea ": A Look
at the Fifth Amendment Implications of Probation Programs for Sex Offenders Requiring
Mandatory Admissions of Guilt, 88 KY. LJ. 485,492 (2000) (arguing that rehabilitation will
be "more fully served by encouraging sex offenders to make the admissions of guilt that
states assert are vital to successful treatment").
" See Jillian Grossman, Note, The Fourth Amendment: Relaxing the Rule in ChildAbuse
Investigations, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1303 (2000).
294 See John Q. LaFond, Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence Be Normatively Neutral? Sexual
Predator Laws: Their Impact on Participants and Policy, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 375 (1999); John
Q. LaFond, The Costs ofEnacting a Sexual Predator Law, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 468
(1998) [hereinafter LaFond, The Costs of Enacting].
" With the Supreme Court's determination that such statutory schemes pass constitutional
muster in the five-to-four opinion ofKansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S 346 (1997), it would not
be surprising to see additional states enacting such civil commitment provisions for
dangerous sex offenders. See LaFond, The Costs of Enacting, supra note 294, at 468.
Washington was the first state to enact a modem sexual predator law in 1990, and at least six
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advise their clients of the potential consequences of making any admissions during
the therapy sessions, thus creating more pressure for resisting involvement in
therapy.2 9
6
If the child alone submits to therapy, while the parent asserts a Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination297 and refuses therapy while
awaiting the criminal trial, 98 or if the parent enrolls in therapy but denies any
misconduct, 99 the parent's attorney would presumably seek access to the child's
therapist's notes and records.3" Given the sense of guilt and personal responsibility
that many abused children exhibit in therapy, it would not be surprising if the
child's disclosures to the therapist - including delays in disclosing and recanting
claims of abuse - open the door to access to these notes and records by the parent-
defendant in the context of the criminal case."'
For instance, a child victim of sexual abuse recants his accusation against a
parent abuser during the course of the child's therapy."2 In preparation for the
criminal trial, the therapist discloses to the prosecutor that the child has recanted his
original testimony. The prosecutor is now obligated0 3 to disclose to the defense the
nature or content of the child's admissions, assuming that the prosecution intends
to rely on the child's testimony at the criminal trial.3 4 Although an experienced
other states, including California, have enacted some form of sexual predator law since then.
Id. For further discussion of Hendricks, see John Kip Cornwell, Understanding the Role of
the Police and Parens Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil Commitment Before and After
Hendricks, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 377 (1998); Robert F. Schopp, Civil Commitment
and Sexual Predators: Competence and Condemnation, 4 PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L. 323
(1998).
296 See Kaden, supra note 291; Jessica Wilen Berg, Note, Give Me Liberty or Give Me
Silence: Taking a Stand on Fifth Amendment Implications for Court-Ordered Therapy
Programs, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 700, 711-12 (1994).
29' See Patton, supra note 288, at 481-82.
29' See HERTZ et al., supra note 262, at § 42.05(a).
299 See Berg, supra note 296, at 703.
300 See generally Murray Levine & Eric Doherty, Professional Issues: The Fifth
Amendment and Therapeutic Requirements to Admit Abuse, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 98
(1991).
301 See Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1205 (2000).
302 "Retractions of accusations by children, particularly in cases of sexual abuse, are quite
common and present difficult questions for any trial court or jury since great weight is
commonly ascribed to the constancy and persistency of any complaint." LUCY S. MCGOUGH,
CHILD WrrNEsSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 178 (1994).
303 See Roland C. Summit et al., The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome:
Clinical Issues and Forensic Implications, in CHILDREN OF TRAUMA: STRESSFUL LIFE
EVENTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 43 (Thomas W. Miller ed.,
1998).
31 See Kurcias, supra note 301.
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mental health professional may be able to explain to the fact finder that the child's
recantation is not inconsistent with the behavior of other sex abuse victims,"0 the
damaging admissions are nevertheless made available to the defense.
The child's most intimate and confidential revelations to the therapist might
constitute evidence which the accused parent would seek to obtain, perhaps as part
of a legal strategy to discredit the child during the criminal trial. 6 Additionally,
if the state prosecutors are aware or in possession of such mental health reports or
records, they may well have affirmative duties to disclose such information to the
parent's counsel. 7 The duties of the prosecutor to disclose material evidence to
the defense include statutory discovery provisions,"' constitutionally-based
obligations,"' and ethical obligations310 included in state legal ethics codes. 31'
30. See Simona Ghetti et al., Consistency in Children's Reports of Sexual and Physical
Abuse, 26 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 977 (2002).
0 One commentator notes that:
Research has identified that many of the cross-examination tactics lawyers use
to question children are suggestive and evidentially unsafe (Brennan & Brennan,
1988; Dent & Flin, 1992; Goodman & Bottoms, 1993; Kranat & Westcott,
1994). The average cross-examination of a child is a virtual "how not to" guide
to investigative interviewing: The characteristics of a typical interview
conducted during cross-examination appear to violate all the principles of best
practice, with the predicted outcome of maximizing the risk of contaminating the
evidence (Spencer & Flin, 1993).
Emily Henderson, Persuading and Controlling: The Theory of Cross-examination in
Relation to Children, in CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY: A HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESEARCH AND FORENSIC PRACTICE 279 (Helen L. Westcott et al. eds., 2002) (citations
omitted).
307 See Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the
Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 833
(1997); Stephen P. Jones, Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 735 (1994).
30 Many state-enacted statutes are based upon the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
FED. R. CiuM. P. 16, 26.2, & 12.1 all require disclosure of information upon request by the
defendant. For example, Rule 16 requires disclosure of five types of information prior to
trial: (1) the defendant's statements; (2) the defendant's prior criminal record; (3) certain
documents and objects; (4) certain examination and test reports; and (5) the content and bases
of expert testimony upon which the government intends to rely. See Grossman, supra note
293.
" The duty to disclose exculpatory evidence should be traced to Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Jones, supra note 307; Kurcias, supra note 301; Weeks, supra
note 307.
310 Both ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (DR
7-103(B)) require that the prosecutor disclose any evidence that "tends to" be exculpatory
as to guilt or punishment. See generally Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to
SeekExculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons From England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
1379 (2000).
31' See generally Joshua M. Levinson& Brian M. Lambert, Discovery, 88 GEO. L.J. 1175
(2000).
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Thus, the competing objectives of the juvenile or civil forum (to obtain an
adjudication and to protect a child in harm's way) and the objectives of the criminal
forum (to enforce the criminal law and prosecute child abusers) 1 make it all the
more difficult to ensure confidentiality of children's mental health records.
Although policy makers and criminal prosecutors should weigh the impact of
exposing children to further harm when civil and criminal judicial systems are not
well coordinated, 313 existing evidentiary rules and constitutional rights of accused
parties 314 - including the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in criminal
cases315 - often preclude ensuring complete confidentialityofchildren's statements
to mental health professionals whether they were made during evaluation or
therapy.316 Crafting a provision which allows for the creation of more than one set
of documents by the mental health professional involved in a juvenile adjudication
may not ultimately shield the more detailed notes and records from the scrutiny of
a potentially adverse party. 1 7 Alternatively, jurisdictions might consider
31 See St. Onge & Elam, supra note 286.
313 Myers concludes that in some cases, the harm to the child caused by the adversarial
intervention of the criminal justice system outweighs any benefit:
Involvement in the legal system is hard on children. The trauma of abuse may be
compounded by the trauma of the criminal justice system. Several courts and
commentators have described the effect of the legal system on abused children
as a "second victimization." The child is subjected to multiple interviews in
which the details of the abuse must be described repeatedly. The delay, anxiety,
and fear associated with litigation and cross-examination are repeated at the
grand jury, pretrial and trial stages. If juvenile court proceedings are underway,
the child goes through a similar, if less adversarial, gauntlet in that court. There
is the embarrassment of appearing in court where the details of an excruciatingly
private event or series of events must be recounted in public and, finally, there
is the requirement that the child face the defendant.
John E.B. Myers, The Legal Response to Child Abuse: In The Best Interest of Children?, 24
J. FAM. L. 149, 182-84 (1985).
314 See John C. Thomure, Jr., Kyles v. Whitley: An Opportunity Lost?: An Examination
of the Rule ofDiscovery Concerning the Disclosure ofImpeachment Material Contained in
Personnel Files of Testifying Government Agents in Federal Criminal Cases, 83 MARQ. L.
REV. 547 (2000).
"' See Alfred Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1173 (1980);
Robert Weisberg, Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory
Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1978).
316 See generally Robert F. Schopp, The Psychotherapist's Duty to Protect the Public: The
Appropriate Standard and the Foundation in Legal Theory andEmpirical Premises, 70NEB,
L. REv. 327 (1991).
317 This is not to suggest that the records should be hidden from other parties. A broad
overview of a record might provide sufficient information to allow another party the
opportunity to request that the court conduct an in camera hearing and review the entire
patient file. This type of process would allow the child's counsel to comply with discovery
requests without initially jeopardizing the confidentiality of the child's therapy or treatment.
This process would also place the court in a position to be aware - prior to an adversarial
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developing rules which place the burden on the party seeking to discover the child's
therapy records to demonstrate the necessity to obtain the records, or perhaps to
request the court to review the documents to determine whether legitimate reason
exists to disclose the child's records. Although not a complete ban against
disclosure of children's mental health records, such statutes or rules might reduce
the opportunities for adverse parties to use such documents to the detriment of
children, while complying with the due process discovery rights of the adverse
parties.
It may be that the most counsel for the child or the mental health professional
can realistically hope to accomplish is to limit the scope of disclosure of the
patient's confidential communications." 8  Additionally, if mental health
professionals develop routines whereby age-appropriate children involved in
dependency proceedings are consulted and informed consent is obtained prior to
disclosing any mental health records, 19 the juvenile court system will have
established a new priority of recognizing the privacy rights of children. 20 If nothing
else, by focusing attention on the impact of unnecessary disclosures and then
determining the exact information which must be disclosed in litigation, the mental
health professional or the child's counsel might increase the child's sense ofprivacy
and help reduce the potential embarrassment and potential trauma"' suffered by the
child when indiscriminate reporting occurs.322 By focusing and limiting the scope
hearing - of the nature of the child's communications to the therapist. If the proceedings are
designed to reunite the child with the parent, then the court's evidentiary rulings may take
that objective into account. If the proceedings are designed to determine whether the child
should be adjudicated dependent, then the court once again may consider the impact of
disclosing all of the child's revelations made to the therapist. Thus, the purpose of the hearing
and the stage of the case would be important factors for the court to consider before revealing
the child's entire mental health record or therapy file to another party. If the party seeking
access to the child's otherwise confidential statements to a therapist believes that an adverse
ruling precludes adequate trial preparation, then the matter might be subject to appellate
review, assuming the material reviewed by the trial court is sealed and made part of the court
record.
3,8 For a discussion of the psychologist adopting the role ofchild advocate and modifying
current ethical duties of therapists involved in the conflict-laden field of family therapy, see
Sonja C. Grover, The Psychologist as Child Advocate: Ethical and Legal Issues in the
Clinical Context, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 43 (2002).
31 One commentator, citing empirical evidence of children involved in psychotherapy,
suggests that limited informed consent might be possible with children as young as six years
of age. Gerald P. Koocher, Competence to Consent: Psychotherapy, in CHILDREN'S
COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 121 (Gary S. Melton et al. eds., 1983).
320 See Wesley B. Crenshaw & James W. Lichtenberg, Child Abuse and the Limits of
Confidentiality: Forewarning Practices, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 181 (1993).
321 See Jim Henry, System Intervention Trauma to Child SexualAbuse Victims Following
Disclosure, 12 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 499 (1997).
3 One of the founders of therapeutic jurisprudence, has indicated that:
To succeed, mental health treatment requires a high degree of trust and
[Vol. 12:511
2004] CONFIDENTIALITY AND JUVENILE MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS 575
of information the court actually requires from mental health professions, and then
by restricting the disclosure of therapeutic and evaluative records of children
whenever possible, the juvenile court system will move in the direction of
respecting the rights of the children323 it was established to protect 24
VIII. CONCLUSION
The juvenile court system continues to rely upon the evaluations and
therapeutic interventions of mental health professionals, but much can be done to
guard against unnecessary disclosures of children's mental health records and
communications. Although the law in most jurisdictions fails to define specific
privacy rights for children,325 the juvenile court system should take a leading role
in recognizing the importance of privacy and confidentiality of juvenile mental
health and treatment records.326 Despite the occasional necessity of using children's
mental health records in court proceedings, there are many situations in which
disclosure may be limited or even prevented. The current practice of admitting
written records or oral testimony that reveal the disclosures children make to mental
health professionals should be scrutinized. Counsel for children and the various
mental health professionals involved have ethical duties to maintain client and
patient confidences, and the foundation for successful therapeutic interventions
confidence by the patient in the therapist. Establishing this trust and confidence
at the outset of the therapeutic relationship may be essential for its ultimate
success. It is precisely at this point that a therapist will feel ethically obligated
to reveal to the patient that the confidentiality of the patient's communications
cannot be fully protected. For at least some patients, the specter of their therapist
as a weapon in the hands of an adversary in litigation will prevent formation of
the therapeutic alliance. Concern about disclosure of intimate and personal
information confided in a therapist thus can have profoundly antitherapeutic
effects for the individual, producing a distrust of the therapist that can make the
therapeutic process impossible.
Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence View,
50 U. MAMI L. REv. 249, 260-61 (1996).
323 This "empowerment of children" approach is not without its pitfalls, however. See
Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child Clients, 84
CORNELLL. REv. 895,898 (1999) (concluding that "because many children lack the capacity
to appreciate their influence over their lawyers or the court, lawyers often will do children
a considerable disservice if they premise their representation on the empowerment ideal").
32 For a discussion of how European courts have been more willing than U.S. courts to
establish affirmative governmental duties to safeguard children's rights, see Tania Schriwer,
Comment, Establishing an Affirmative GovernmentalDuty to Protect Children 's Rights: The
European Court of Human Rights As a Model for the United States Supreme Court, 34
U.S.F. L. REV. 379 (1999).
" But see Williams, supra note 84.
'2 See Gary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood"for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy
As Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983).
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depends on maintaining the confidentiality of patient disclosures. Where the legal
system recognizes exceptions to the duties of confidentiality, children's lawyers and
mental health professionals may still take steps and precautions to restrict the flow
of information obtained during evaluations and therapy.
By protecting the information children reveal in these evaluative and
therapeutic settings, the professionals involved serve the vital role of establishing
a trustful and therapeutic environment in which these children may begin to heal.
There is no reason to further expose children in dependency proceedings to pain and
humiliation once their very lives become the subject of litigation. A recognized
goal of dependency cases should be to encourage children to trust the mental health
professionals assigned to treat and evaluate them. In these delicate matters, we
should strive as professionals to establish and respect the privacy rights of children
whenever possible, 3" and to promote confidentiality whenever children require
mental health services. Considering the total upheaval these children experience
when the state intervenes and removes them from abusive or neglectful families, the
reliance on mental health professionals by the court system should contribute to -
not detract from - the child's stability and recovery. By recognizing the
importance of children's private communications with therapists, and by moving to
prevent unnecessary disclosure of children's communications, the juvenile court
system will establish as a priority not simply the recognition of privacy rights and
respect for the dignity of minors, 328 but the healing and well being of the abused and
neglected children over whom it asserts jurisdiction.
327 See generally Gary B. Melton, Socialization in the Global Community: Respectfor the
Dignity of Children, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 66 (1991).
"' See Charles Robert Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity of Minors: What the
Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293 (1988).
[Vol. 12:511
